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This study examines control in a teamwork setting, experimentally 
investigating two financial incentive systems that have been proposed in the 
agency theory-based analytic literature.  Both systems rely on mutual monitoring, 
the ability of team members to observe each other’s actions.  However, the 
systems differ on whether team members report observations of their peers' efforts 
to management (vertical incentive system) or directly control the actions of each 
other (horizontal incentive system).  Findings suggest that the effectiveness of 
these systems depends on the level of team identity.  Specifically, the 
effectiveness of a vertical incentive system is degraded by a strong team identity.  
On the other hand, a horizontal incentive system becomes more effective in the 
presence of a strong team identity. 
 vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables........................................................................................................viii 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ ix 
Chapter 1:  Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2:  Agency Theory in a Teamwork Environment ...................................... 9 
Chapter 3:  Social Identity Theory ........................................................................ 23 
Chapter 4:  Model Development ........................................................................... 37 
Chapter 5:  Hypotheses ......................................................................................... 50 
Chapter 6:  Description of Method........................................................................ 61 
Chapter 7:  Results ................................................................................................ 69 
Chapter 8:  Summary and Conclusions ............................................................... 106 
Appendix A – Experimental Materials................................................................ 110 
Appendix B – Instructional Slides ...................................................................... 122 
Appendix C – Post-Experimental Questionnaire ................................................ 127 
Appendix D – Communication Transcript Samples ........................................... 130 
References ........................................................................................................... 132 
Vita….................................................................................................................. 141 
 vii 
List of Tables 
Table 1 – Conditional Probability Distribution for Output ................................... 47 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 89 
Table 3 – Tests for Normality ............................................................................... 91 
Table 4 – ANOVA for Hypothesis 1..................................................................... 92 
Table 5 – Alternate Analysis of Hypothesis 1....................................................... 93 
Table 6 – ANOVA for Hypothesis 3..................................................................... 94 
Table 7 – Alternate ANOVA for Hypothesis 3..................................................... 95 
Table 8 – Contingent Decision Making Under the Vertical System..................... 96 
Table 9 – Contingent Decision Making Under the Horizontal System................. 97 
Table 10 – Trend Analysis Using the Friedman Test............................................ 98 
Table 11 – Trend Analysis Using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test .......................... 99 
 viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 – Vertical Incentive Structure ................................................................. 48 
Figure 2 – Horizontal Incentive Structure............................................................. 49 
Figure 3 – The Effect of Team Identity on Incentive Effectiveness ..................... 58 
Figure 4 – Hypothesis 1 ........................................................................................ 59 
Figure 5 – Hypothesis 3 ........................................................................................ 60 
Figure 6 – Room Layout for Instructional Phase .................................................. 65 
Figure 7 – Room Layout for Task Phase............................................................... 66 
Figure 8 – Resource Decision Form...................................................................... 67 
Figure 9 – Report Form......................................................................................... 68 
Figure 10 – Hypothesis 1 Results........................................................................ 100 
Figure 11 – Hypothesis 2 Results........................................................................ 101 
Figure 12 – Hypothesis 3 Results........................................................................ 102 
Figure 13 – Contingent Decision Making Under the Vertical System ............... 103 
Figure 14 – Contingent Decision Making Under the Horizontal System ........... 104 
Figure 15 – Trend Analysis ................................................................................. 105 
  
 ix 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The use of teams in the workplace has increased dramatically over the last 
several decades (Cohen and Bailey 1997).1  For example, Hewitt Associates, 
based on their 1995 research on salary growth, report that 65% of surveyed 
companies use teams in some capacity.  Similarly, the IMA (Institute of 
Management Accountants) reports in its 1999 Practice Analysis that 73% of 
survey respondents work at companies where management accountants are 
involved in cross-functional teams.   
The trend toward greater use of teams began in Japanese companies, and it 
is now widely accepted that teamwork is critical for achieving success.  Firms 
report a number of benefits of teams, including greater participation and 
involvement, increased attention to process improvements, and improved 
employee satisfaction (Wellins et al. 1994).  Many young companies (e.g., 
Southwest Airlines (Kelley 2000), Whole Foods (Fishman 1996), and Cisco 
Systems (Gillmor 2000)) use teams as a central organizing principle, but even 
older, more established companies herald the benefits of teamwork. For example, 
General Mills, Inc. has reported that productivity is as much as 40% higher in 
                                                 
1 Firms use teams in a number of different ways.  Lawler and Cohen (1992) classify teams into 
three major categories – parallel teams, project teams, and work teams.  Parallel teams involve 
workers who are temporarily removed from their regular duties to participate in some interim 
activity.  Project teams are also temporary, but the participants on these teams generally remain in 
their regular assignments for the duration of the project.  In contrast to these first two categories, 
work teams – the primary focus of this paper – are permanent groups engaged in producing a 
product or service.  Examples of work teams include production teams and administrative support 
teams  (Abosch and Reidy 1996).  Of the companies using teams, Hewitt Associates (1995) report 
that about 77% use work teams. 
 1 
factories using a team-based as compared to a traditional approach (Dumaine 
1990). 
In response to the increased use of teams, researchers in a number of 
disciplines have begun to examine factors related to team effectiveness.  
Accountants and economists have modeled managerial control systems, with a 
particular emphasis on contracting and financial incentives.  With basic 
assumptions rooted in individual rationality and self-interested behavior, such 
models tend to view a team simply as a collection of individuals, united only by 
interdependent tasks or incentives.  Research in social psychology and related 
fields, on the other hand, recognizes that a team is more than a collection of 
interdependent individuals.  This literature has examined the social ties that often 
develop among coworkers, suggesting that a real team exists only when the 
members have a sense of oneness, or team identity. 
This study builds on both lines of research, proposing that insights from 
each may be useful in understanding team behavior.  Specifically, in evaluating 
the potential usefulness of alternate incentive systems, it is important to consider 
the level of team identity.  In this regard, I show that the incentive system 
interacts with the team identity, such that the effectiveness of an incentive system 
may be either enhanced or degraded by a strong team identity, depending on 
specific characteristics of the system. 
This study examines two types of incentive systems, consistent with two 
fundamental approaches that have emerged in the analytic literature on multi-
agent settings.  Both approaches rely on peer monitoring, the idea that while the 
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principal (manager) cannot observe the actions of team members, the team 
members may be able to observe each other’s actions.  The use of peer monitoring 
is common in practice.  In fact, psychology research shows that peer monitoring is 
a somewhat automatic process, conducted for the purpose of comparing oneself to 
others (Kunda 1999, 298).  However, peer monitoring alone may not affect the 
behavior of workers.  It must be incorporated, either formally or informally, into 
the incentive system.  The analytic modeling literature has identified two general 
approaches for doing so. 
Under the first approach, the agents monitor one another and report 
observations to the principal, who compensates the agents based on these reports. 
Because of its emphasis on hierarchical communication and control, this system 
will be referred to as the vertical incentive system. A prototypical example is Ma 
(1988).  Peer evaluations are commonly used for career development purposes.  
For example, a number of firms have adopted “360 evaluation” systems, in which 
each worker evaluates the performance of superiors, subordinates and peers 
(Edwards and Ewen 1996).  Notably, though, there has been a reluctance to report 
these evaluations upwardly or to use them as a formal basis for compensation.  
For example, a 1995 Saville and Holdsworth survey found that only 7% of large 
companies included peer evaluations in their formal appraisal systems (Thatcher 
1996).  In fact, a number of authorities (e.g. W. Edwards Deming, Peter Drucker, 
and Tom Peters) warn expressly against using peer evaluations in this way 
(Coates 1998).  Thus, the use of vertical reports of peer observations for incentive 
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contracting purposes, as conceptualized in economic theory, is not common in 
practice.2 
The second approach does not involve vertical reporting.  Instead, the 
principal creates self-managing teams, basing each agent’s pay on the team’s joint 
output, and providing team members with a means of controlling one another, 
through formal sanctions, peer pressure, or enforceable side contracting.  A 
prototypical example is Arya, Fellingham and Glover (hereafter AFG) (1997).  
Because of its emphasis on peer-enacted control, this system will be referred to as 
the horizontal incentive system.  Unlike the vertical approach, the horizontal 
approach corresponds to a practice commonly observed in the real world.  The 
popular press has discussed the role of peer pressure and social norms in helping 
Japanese companies achieve success (Nahavandi and Aranda 1994).  Likewise, 
North American firms have shifted control from supervisors to self-managing 
teams (Dumaine 1990), often using team-based compensation (DeMatteo et al. 
1998) and lateral control regimes (Lazega 2000).  A recent study by the Center for 
Effective Organizations at The University of Southern California reports that 68% 
of Fortune 1000 companies use self-managed teams in some capacity (Dumaine 
1994). 
Analytically, these two approaches (vertical vs. horizontal) are two means 
to the same end, in that similar results can be obtained mathematically under the 
two systems.  The premise of this study is that this analytic similarity is an 
                                                 
2 Very recently, several large consulting firms have begun to market their peer evaluation systems 
for compensation purposes, and businesses have begun to experiment with tying pay to peer 
reports.  It is unclear, however, whether these implementations will be successful (Edwards and 
Ewen 1996), and this remains a subject of controversy among human resources professionals. 
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oversimplification, because actual results under the two systems depend on the 
degree to which team members have established a team identity.  Specifically, a 
strong team identity is likely to differentially affect effort levels under the two 
incentive systems because of its impact on strategy choice.  Members of highly 
identified teams are more attuned to the possibility of mutually beneficial 
outcomes and will coordinate their strategies to achieve these outcomes.  Under 
the horizontal approach, this will lead to the desirable outcome of greater effort, 
whereas under the vertical approach, this will lead to the undesirable, collusive 
outcome of lower effort and false reporting. 
This research is important to managers wishing to maximize the 
effectiveness of work teams and to managerial accountants and assurance 
providers who design and evaluate managerial control systems.  It contributes to 
their efforts in several ways.  First, a considerable body of analytic modeling 
research has focused on the use of incentives to motivate desired behavior by 
employees, including recent efforts to design systems specifically for the 
teamwork environment.  This research contributes to this stream of literature by 
providing evidence that the incentive system cannot be considered in a vacuum.  
Instead, it shows that psychological factors – specifically, the strength of team 
identity – play an important role in determining the effectiveness of various 
incentive systems.  In doing so, this paper answers recent calls for research that 
melds theory from both economics and psychology to provide insights into 
accounting issues (Haynes and Kachelmeier 1998; Moser 1998; Waller 1995; 
Waller 2001). 
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Second, this study addresses the measurement and contracting challenge 
presented by the teamwork setting. When accurate and verifiable measures of 
individual contributions are not available, incentive contracting may not be useful 
for encouraging employees to direct their efforts toward management’s goals.  
Instead, the use of team incentives may result in free-riding.  One solution to this 
problem is the use of the unconventional measure of peer observations.  Such a 
measure is “soft” in the sense that it is not directly verifiable and does not meet 
the stringent measurement requirements to be included in the accounting library 
(Demski 1997).  It may nonetheless be useful for incentive contracting purposes, 
and this study provides evidence on how such a measure can be used most 
effectively. 
Third, this research provides evidence on the types of incentive systems 
that are most likely to be effective for different types of teams.  Prior studies have 
emphasized the antecedents of team identification, showing that various team 
characteristics (e.g., the functional diversity of members, the team’s status in the 
organization, and the members’ time commitment to team activities) affect the 
degree to which members establish a team identity (Scott 1997).  By focusing on 
the consequences of team identification, this study aids in developing the causal 
linkages among team characteristics, incentives, and performance.   
Finally, this study provides insight into why firms have enthusiastically 
embraced compensation plans based on team output (the horizontal approach), but 
have been reluctant to tie pay to peer reports (the vertical approach).  Part of this 
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reluctance may be because the strong team identity that emerges in many 
teamwork settings undermines the incentive effects of the vertical approach.  
Graduate business students participated in a 2 X 2 (Incentive System X 
Team Identity) between-subjects factorial design. Each experimental session 
involved eight participants, randomly assigned to four two-person teams.  Team 
members assumed the roles of two division managers working for the same 
company, with compensation dependent upon their decisions.  Each person’s 
primary responsibility was to choose the level of effort (or more broadly, the level 
of resources) his/her division would commit to the production process. The first 
manipulated factor is the incentive system, capturing the two models of interest 
(vertical vs. horizontal).  The second factor is the level of team identity, 
manipulated through a random assignment of participants into color groups.  Each 
session of eight participants included two four-person color groups. In the high 
identity condition, four two-person teams were formed by pairing each participant 
with a participant from his/her color group.  The low identity condition also 
involved four two-person teams, but with each participant paired with a 
participant from the other color group.  The experimental case further enhanced 
(reduced) the salience of team identity in the high (low) identity condition. 
The primary dependent variable is the level of effort chosen.  I 
hypothesize and find a significant interaction between the incentive system and 
the level of team identity.  Specifically, under the horizontal approach, a strong 
team identity leads to increased effort levels.  However, under the vertical 
approach, a strong team identity leads to decreased effort levels.  Further tests 
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provide evidence that this effect is a result of both a cognitive change, leading 
team members to focus on joint vs. individual outcomes, and an increase in 
communication.  Moreover, the incentive systems themselves differentially 
reinforce team identity, in that after repeated interaction, the level of team identity 
becomes higher for teams using the horizontal incentive system than for those 
using the vertical incentive system.   
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 
presents a review of the multi-agent literature from economics and accounting.  
Chapter 3 presents a review of the psychology-based literature on Social Identity 
Theory.  In Chapter 4, I develop a model of team production with mutual 
monitoring.  This model is combined with the psychology literature to develop 
hypotheses in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 describes the experimental methodology used 
to test these hypotheses.  Chapter 7 presents the results and statistical analysis.  
Finally, Chapter 8 provides a summary and concluding remarks.  Four appendices 
are included.  Appendix A is a copy of the experimental materials.  Appendix B 
shows the instructional slides presented during the experimental sessions.  
Appendix C presents the post-experimental questionnaire.  Appendix D provides 
sample transcripts of the communication that occurred between teammates.
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Chapter 2:  Agency Theory in a Teamwork Environment 
THE MULTI-AGENT SETTING 
The analytic literature on contracting has begun to explore the 
implications of team settings.  Most of the models are based on the principal-
agent paradigm, with the basic model (Holmstrom 1979) modified to include 
multiple agents.  The literature has identified at least four ways in which the 
principal can improve his/her contracting position by taking advantage of the 
multi-agent setting.   
First, if the agents share some common uncertainty, then each agent’s 
output provides information about the other agent’s state uncertainty (Holmstrom 
1982).  In this case, relative performance evaluations are valuable to the principal 
(e.g., Arya and Glover 1996a; Frederickson 1992; Gibbons and Murphy 1990; 
Holmstrom 1982; Mookherjee 1984).  Second, if the agents are risk averse, then 
the multi-agent setting allows for risk sharing among agents, reducing the 
principal’s agency costs (Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1991; Villadsen 1995).  
Third, in the multi-agent setting, incentives can be designed to encourage 
information sharing, helping, and other cooperative acts (Itoh 1991; Tirole 1988; 
Villadsen 1995).  Finally, while the principal cannot observe the agents’ actions, 
the agents may be able to observe each other, and the principal may achieve gains 
by encouraging mutual peer monitoring (e.g., AFG 1997; Ma 1988).  It is this 
final feature of the multi-agent setting – the opportunity for mutual monitoring – 
upon which this study focuses.  The mutual monitoring literature can be divided 
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into two basic approaches – the vertical approach and the horizontal approach.  
The literature related to each approach is discussed below. 
THE VERTICAL INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
Agency theorists have developed an extensive literature on incentive 
contracts that rely on vertical communication (agent to principal) in a multi-agent 
setting (Arya and Glover 1996b; Demski and Sappington 1984; Demski et al. 
1988; Fischer & Hughes 1997; Ma 1988; Ma et al. 1988).3  While the assumptions 
and forms of these vertical incentive contracts vary, the general model is one in 
which each agent observes the other agent’s action and truthfully reports it to the 
principal.4  The agents are essentially whistle blowers, who pass along to the 
principal any information they gather about their co-workers.  The vertical 
approach relies heavily on the assumption that the agents will choose their 
strategies independently, because any coordination among them will likely reduce 
the reliability of their reports. 
The principal’s maximization problem in a typical multi-agent analysis is 
analogous to that in a single-agent analysis – the principal maximizes his/her own 
utility, subject to the agents’ individual rationality and incentive compatibility 
constraints.  A key difference between the single-agent and multi-agent settings, 
                                                 
3 Similar schemes, involving reporting of private information, may also be used in a single-agent 
setting, but the multi-agent setting often provides additional gains to the principal.  For example, 
in a private information setting, Demski and Sappington (1984) show that the agents’ rents are 
reduced whenever their private information is even imperfectly correlated.  Similarly, in an 
unobservable action setting, Ma (1988) shows that the principal is able to achieve the first-best 
contracting result whenever the agents are able to perfectly observe each other’s efforts. 
4 These reports may be in the form of direct communication from the agents to the principal or 
may be indirect (e.g., the principal makes an inference based on the agents’ choices among 
lotteries). 
 10 
however, is the form of the incentive compatibility constraint.  In the single-agent 
setting, the incentive compatibility constraint requires that the agent select the 
action that maximizes his/her utility.  In multi-agent studies using the vertical 
approach, the incentive compatibility constraint typically requires that the agents 
play a Nash equilibrium in their subgame. 
A problem that often occurs under the vertical approach is the potential for 
tacit collusion (e.g., Demski and Sappington 1984; Mookherjee 1984).  This 
problem occurs whenever the incentive system fails to uniquely implement the 
principal’s desired solution.  That is, while the incentive compatibility constraint 
requires that the agents play a Nash equilibrium, this Nash equilibrium may not be 
unique.  In fact, it almost certainly is not unique, and in many cases it is Pareto 
dominated (from the agents’ point of view) by an equilibrium that is undesirable 
to the principal.  The implementation literature has therefore explored ways to 
ensure that the agents not only play a Nash equilibrium in their subgame, but that 
they play the specific Nash equilibrium desired by the principal.  Methods for 
ensuring this unique implementation include tightening the incentive 
compatibility constraint to require the play of dominant strategies (Demski and 
Sappington 1984), increasing the size of the strategy set through the use of multi-
stage mechanisms (e.g., Fischer and Hughes 1997; Ma 1988; Ma et al. 1988), and 
using a number of simple accounting-based mechanisms (e.g., Arya and Glover 
1995; Arya and Glover 1996a; Arya and Glover 1996b; Arya, Glover and Hughes 
1997).  Many of the studies reviewed in this chapter are part of this 
implementation literature. 
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Ma (1988) is a prototypical example of the vertical approach.  Ma (1988) 
investigates a moral hazard problem, adopting the production setting introduced 
by Mookherjee (1984).  He proposes a solution to the tacit collusion problem 
(discussed above) both in a setting where the two agents can monitor one another 
and in a setting where the agents’ actions are unobservable to one another.  The 
mutual monitoring setting is particularly relevant to the present study.  In this 
setting, Ma (1988) shows that the principal’s desired outcome can be uniquely 
implemented as a perfect equilibrium.  Specifically, Ma (1988) proposes a two-
stage mechanism.  In the first stage, both agents select their actions.  In the second 
stage (before outcome is realized), one of the agents reports to the principal the 
actions taken by both the agents, and the other agent verifies this report.  The key 
element of the solution is that if the second agent challenges the first agent’s 
report, s/he accepts an output-based lottery, which is valuable only if the first 
agent actually did lie.  The unique perfect equilibrium under this setting has both 
agents choosing the principal’s desired actions, the first agent submitting a 
truthful report, and the second agent verifying that report.  Ma’s solution to the 
tacit collusion problem is particularly appealing because it is a first-best solution – 
the risk averse agents take on no risk in equilibrium, because pay is based on 
reports of actions, and not on stochastic outcomes. 
While Ma’s (1988) mechanism solves the tacit collusion problem, it is 
important to note that off-equilibrium collusion is still possible.  Specifically, the 
agents can improve their outcomes by choosing low levels of effort and agreeing 
to lie to the principal.  This is not a tacit collusion problem, as defined by the 
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literature, because it is off the equilibrium path – each agent has strict incentives 
to report truthfully.  However, under some circumstances, agents may reach this 
collusive outcome, as proposed in Chapter 5.  The opportunity for off-equilibrium 
collusion is a feature common to mutual monitoring studies using the vertical 
approach to incentive contracting. 
Fischer and Hughes (1997) extend Ma (1988) to what they claim is a more 
realistic setting, in which the agents can only imperfectly monitor one another’s 
actions.  In the Fischer and Hughes (1997) model, each agent receives a private 
signal after actions are taken but before outcomes are realized.  This signal may 
be interpreted as an imperfect observation of the other agent’s effort.  The 
contracting mechanism provides each agent with incentives to truthfully report to 
the principal the signal received, and compensation is a function of the signals 
reported and the output produced.  Because compensation depends in part on the 
output produced, the agents take on some risk, for which they must be 
compensated.  Therefore, unlike Ma (1988), Fischer and Hughes (1997) do not 
provide a first-best solution.  However, Fischer and Hughes (1997) are able to 
almost costlessly solve the tacit collusion problem, “knocking out” all equilibria 
that Pareto dominate the principal’s desired equilibrium.  As is true with Ma’s 
(1988) solution, an off-equilibrium opportunity for collusion still exists.  The 
agents can improve their outcomes by agreeing to report falsely to the principal. 
Arya and Glover (1996b) address the tacit collusion problem in a slightly 
different setting, one in which the two agents are not ex ante symmetric.  Instead, 
one agent is a division manager and the other is a verifier (or auditor).  While this 
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setting is not completely analogous to the team setting of the current study, certain 
insights from Arya and Glover’s (1996b) model are applicable to the team setting 
as well.  Their paper provides an interesting blend of unobserved action (moral 
hazard) and private information (adverse selection).  The division manager has 
private information regarding the division’s cost function.  The verifier is subject 
to moral hazard, in that s/he can choose to work or to shirk in fulfilling the 
verification duties, and this choice is unobservable by the principal.  (If the 
verifier works, s/he will learn the true cost incurred by the division manager.  
However, if s/he shirks, s/he receives an uninformative signal of costs.)  Arya and 
Glover (1996b) show that in the one-period game, the tacit collusion problem is 
so severe that it is impossible to construct a tacit collusion-proof mechanism.  In 
the one-period setting, therefore, the verification process is valueless to the 
principal.  However, when the model is extended to multiple periods, Arya and 
Glover (1996b) solve the tacit collusion problem through the use of historical cost 
reports.  Notably, off-equilibrium collusion is still possible, involving the division 
manager reporting that costs are high and the verifier shirking on the verification 
duties and verifying the division manager’s report. 
While the papers discussed to this point explicitly assume the agents can 
observe each other’s actions, other papers relate to mutual monitoring in a more 
indirect manner.  These studies generally describe a private information (adverse 
selection) problem, rather than an unobservable action (moral hazard) problem.  
In the typical private information problem, the two agents have private 
information regarding their divisions’ productivities, and a direct revelation 
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mechanism is used to induce the agents to truthfully reveal this information to the 
principal.  If the private information is correlated, this setting is conceptually 
similar to a setting in which each agent can imperfectly observe the other’s action, 
because after an agent observes his/her own private information and the other 
agent’s output, s/he can make an inference about the other agent’s effort.  (If the 
private information is perfectly correlated, each agent can perfectly discern the 
other’s effort once the output is observed.) 
An example of the indirect approach is Demski and Sappington’s (1984) 
seminal model of contracting in a setting where multiple agents have correlated 
private information.  Demski and Sappington (1984) show that the principal 
extracts rents from the agents whenever their information is correlated.  The 
principal accomplishes this feat by requiring each agent to predict the other’s 
output (by picking a lottery contingent on the other agent’s output).  This 
prediction is an implicit report, a revelation of each agent’s private information, 
and the principal captures the agents’ rents when the information is revealed.  In 
fact, if the agents are risk neutral and the information is even slightly correlated, 
then the agents earn zero rents.   
Demski and Sappington (1984) readily acknowledge the problem of tacit 
collusion.  Their solution is to tighten the incentive compatibility constraint to 
require the agents to play subgame dominant strategies.  As this is a costly 
solution, Demski and Sappington (1984) show that a less costly mechanism for 
solving the tacit collusion problem is asymmetric, with one agent constrained to 
play a Nash equilibrium and the other constrained to play only subgame dominant 
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strategies.  As is true for the models addressing mutual monitoring in a more 
direct manner, there is still an opportunity for off-equilibrium collusion, whereby 
agents agree to coordinate their reports and outputs to their mutual advantage. 
Ma et al. (1988) also address the tacit collusion problem in a setting where 
the agents have correlated private information regarding their productivities.  In 
this setting, the principal’s preference is that each agent matches his/her output 
level to his/her productivity level (producing low output when productivity is low, 
and producing high output when productivity is high). This is similar to Demski 
and Sappington’s setting, but Ma et al. (1988) take a different approach to the 
problem.  Their solution is to induce one agent to police the other.  The principal 
increases the message space available to the agents, allowing one agent to signal 
the principal if s/he believes the other agent is cheating (choosing low output 
when his/her productivity is actually high).  By taking advantage of this policing 
activity, the principal is able to costlessly eliminate the tacit collusion problem, 
though off-equilibrium collusion is still a possibility. 
The papers discussed here, as well as others not related to mutual 
monitoring (e.g., Demski et al. 1988; Glover 1994), have focused on solving the 
tacit collusion problem.  While these papers suggest a number of methods for 
solving the tacit collusion problem, they are not aimed at eliminating 
opportunities for off-equilibrium collusion.  This lack of attention to off-
equilibrium outcomes is not surprising, because models using the vertical 
approach to mutual monitoring contracts rely on the fundamental assumption that 
agents will independently choose their strategies to maximize their individual 
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utilities.  Side contracting among the agents, explicit or implicit, is not allowed.  
Under this assumption, off-equilibrium outcomes are not a concern to the 
principal, because these outcomes could not be sustained without some type of 
enforcement mechanism.  Models taking a horizontal approach, as discussed in 
the next section, make a different assumption.  These studies assume that agents 
will coordinate their strategies and enforce their agreements through either formal 
or informal mechanisms. 
THE HORIZONTAL INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
The second way in which the principal can take advantage of the 
opportunity for mutual monitoring is through the use of a horizontal incentive 
system, relying on team self-management and peer-based control   (e.g., AFG 
1997; Barron & Gjerde 1997; Itoh 1993; Kandel and Lazear 1992; Prendergast 
1999; Radner 1986; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1991; Tirole 1988; Varian 1990; 
Villadsen 1995).  In contrast to the vertical approach, a horizontal incentive 
system does not involve reporting to the principal.  Instead, the principal assumes 
that the agents will explicitly or implicitly coordinate their actions.  Therefore, the 
principal creates an incentive system that induces the agents to agree (among 
themselves) to the actions desired by the principal and to enforce these 
agreements through the use of formal sanctions, peer pressure, or enforceable side 
contracting (either explicit or implicit). 
Tacit collusion is generally not a concern when the incentive system is 
based on the horizontal approach.  Recall that under the vertical approach, the 
incentive compatibility constraint typically requires that the agents play a Nash 
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equilibrium in their subgame.  The potential for tacit collusion in this setting 
stems from the possibility that multiple equilibria will exist, and that the 
equilibrium preferred by the agents will not be the one preferred by the principal.  
The incentive compatibility constraint often takes a different form under the 
horizontal approach, eliminating the potential for tacit collusion.  For example, 
Villadsen (1995) (discussed below) suggests that if agents can side contract, and 
if utility is transferable among agents, the incentive compatibility constraint 
requires only that agents maximize their joint utility.  The principal delegates to 
the agents the choice of how to divide effort among themselves.  This delegation 
is typical of the horizontal approach, and it requires a shift from a fundamental 
assumption made under the vertical approach – the assumption that the agents 
cannot make enforceable side contracts among themselves. 
Tirole (1988) challenges the assumption that side contracting is not 
possible.  He criticizes the “grand contract” approach, under which all members 
of an organization are assumed to be linked under one grand contract, with all 
behavior and interaction specified by that contract.  Tirole (1988) claims that this 
approach is unrealistic, arguing instead for a multi-contract approach that 
recognizes the sociological nature of the work environment.  He suggests that in 
practice, members of organizations are likely to side contract in various ways, 
making use of both monetary and non-monetary side payments. 
Itoh (1993) provides support for Tirole’s argument, and shows that side 
contracts can actually improve the principal’s welfare.  Itoh (1993) demonstrates 
that when agents can mutually monitor each other, incentive schemes that 
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acknowledge and exploit the agents’ ability to make and enforce side-agreements 
often can be implemented at lower costs than those that assume no side 
contracting. As discussed earlier, when side contracting is allowed, the incentive 
compatibility constraint is altered.  Under Itoh’s (1993) “full-side contracting 
assumption,” the incentive compatibility constraint requires that the agents 
implement Pareto optimal effort choices, rather than Nash equilibria.  The 
reduction in costs under this assumption is the result not of risk sharing or co-
insurance, but of improved coordination of actions.5  Interestingly, Itoh (1993) 
shows that the value of side contracting is limited to situations involving mutual 
monitoring, demonstrating that if agents can observe each other’s outputs but not 
their efforts, the principal cannot improve his/her position by allowing for side 
contracting.   
In a related paper, Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991) seek to specify 
conditions under which side contracting is beneficial or detrimental to the 
principal.  They focus on the conditional correlation between the two agents’ 
outputs, showing that there is a critical point under which the principal will prefer 
a “cooperative organization of tasks.”  This cooperative organization is closely 
related to the notion of side contracting, as it involves mutual monitoring and joint 
determination of efforts and payoffs.   
Similarly, Villadsen (1995) distinguishes between beneficial and 
detrimental collusion among agents.  In her analysis, the opportunity for collusion 
is exogenous, determined by organizational and environmental factors outside the 
                                                 
5 Itoh (1993) also discusses vertical (revelation-based) incentive systems, arguing that such 
systems “fall apart” when agents can side contract. 
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model.  She argues that if collusive opportunities exist, the principal must create 
an incentive system that either prevents collusion (a collusion-proof mechanism) 
or exploits it (a cooperative mechanism).  She demonstrates that the cooperative 
mechanism is generally preferable to the collusion-proof mechanism, because it 
allows for more efficient sharing of effort and risk.  Hence, side contracting can 
be beneficial to the organization if it is specifically accounted for in the incentive 
system design. 
The papers discussed thus far in this section explore explicit side 
contracting by the agents.  AFG (1997), on the other hand, propose an incentive 
system based on implicit side contracting.  That is, the agents’ ability to enforce 
agreements arises not from formal contracts and enforcement mechanisms, but 
from the incentive system itself.  Specifically, AFG (1997) suggest that by 
altering incentives in the second period of a two-period model, the principal can 
induce agents to mutually monitor and to punish one another for shirking.  This 
punishment takes the form of a tit-for-tat strategy, whereby each agent works in 
Period 1, and then works again in Period 2 only if the other agent worked in 
Period 1.  Thus, as is the case when side contracts are explicit, AFG’s (1997) 
control concept is horizontal in nature – the agents choose the actions preferred by 
the principal, because other agents will punish them if they choose otherwise. 
AFG (1997) and the other papers discussed to this point suggest formal 
mechanisms that enable agents to control one another.  In the case of AFG (1997), 
control stems from the incentive system itself, whereas other papers assume 
explicit enforcement mechanisms.  Horizontal control can also be achieved 
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through informal mechanisms, such as the use of peer pressure.  Kandel and 
Lazear (1992) discuss peer pressure in a partnership setting, seeking to provide a 
rigorous framework for studying this somewhat intuitive concept.  They 
conceptualize peer pressure as one team member’s credible threat to punish 
another for effort below the desired level.  Under this definition, AFG’s (1997) 
tit-for-tat strategy is an example of horizontal control based on peer pressure. 
While peer pressure may serve the useful purpose of allowing the agents 
to horizontally control one another, Barron and Gjerde (1997) suggest that peer 
pressure imposes a cost as well.  They assume that this cost is borne by both the 
provider and the recipient of the peer pressure, and that the principal must 
compensate the agents for these extra costs in the “peer pressure environment.”  
Thus, Barron and Gjerde (1997) show that introducing peer pressure into the work 
environment alters the optimum incentive system.  This alteration provides an 
explanation for the empirical observation that incentives are often muted relative 
to the predictions of agency theory.  Barron and Gjerde’s (1997) notion that peer 
pressure can impose costs is supported by a number of studies on “concertive 
control” (Barker 1993; Ezzamel and Willmott 1998; Lazega 2000; Sewell 1998).  
These studies document that self-managed teams often establish strict norms of 
behavior and harsh disciplinary practices.  While self-managed teams have been 
advocated as a positive alternative to inflexible and dehumanizing hierarchical 
systems, Barker (1993) argues that they often have the unintended effect of 
creating hostility among team members. 
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VERTICAL VS. HORIZONTAL INCENTIVE SYSTEMS 
As discussed above, a fundamental difference between the approaches of 
the horizontal and vertical incentive systems is related to the agents’ ability to 
make and enforce side contracts.  Under the vertical incentive system, agents are 
assumed to make their decisions independently, as they have no mechanism, 
formal or informal, for enforcing agreements among themselves.  Under the 
horizontal approach, on the other hand, the principal assumes that the agents can 
agree upon their actions and enforce these agreements through formal or informal 
mechanisms.  This distinction is at the heart of this study. 
In Chapter 5, I argue that team identity (a concept introduced in Chapter 3) 
differentially influences the effectiveness of the two incentive systems.  The basis 
of this argument is in the side contracting issue.  Specifically, I argue that 
members of highly identified teams will become more attuned to joint rather than 
individual outcomes, and will actively coordinate their decisions to maximize 
joint outcomes.  This coordination implies some type of side contracting, in that it 
involves an agreement between the agents as to the actions each will take.  Thus, 
as team identity increases, side contracting will become more likely, and the 
effectiveness of the horizontal system will increase relative to the vertical 
incentive system.  This is the primary hypothesis of the paper, developed more 
fully in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3:  Social Identity Theory 
SIDE CONTRACTING PREDICTIONS FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
As developed in the prior chapter, a key difference between the horizontal 
and vertical systems relates to assumptions about side contracting.  The vertical 
system assumes that team members choose their strategies independently, with no 
coordination or side contracting between the agents.  In contrast, the horizontal 
incentive system relies on the assumption that the agents will cooperate, 
coordinating their actions through implicit or explicit side contracts.  Therefore, to 
predict the effectiveness of either system in eliciting high levels of effort, one 
must understand the likelihood of coordinated behavior among the agents.  The 
analytic models of the preceding chapter treat the level of coordination as an 
exogenous factor, and do not delve into the processes through which such 
coordination emerges. Social psychology research, on the other hand, provides a 
theory for predicting when team members will coordinate their actions.  In this 
chapter, I introduce the theory, and review the related theoretical and empirical 
literature.  In Chapter 5, I apply the theory to the incentive systems of interest to 
this study, and make specific predictions regarding the effectiveness of vertical 
and horizontal incentive systems. 
SELF-CATEGORIZATIONS 
The concepts of team identity, cohesion, and esprit de corps are somewhat 
intuitive.  From sports teams to production teams, organizations seem convinced 
that teams that “hang together” achieve greater results than those that are simply 
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collections of individuals working separately.  A number of consulting firms (e.g., 
Teambuilding, Inc.; Team Builders Plus; Center for Creative Leadership) 
specialize in training aimed at teambuilding, a term related to the notion that a 
team can be more than the sum of its parts.  To investigate this intuition more 
rigorously, I use a body of theory from social psychology collectively known as 
Social Identity Theory (Abrams and Hogg 1990). 
Social Identity Theory, in general, describes the psychological processes 
that occur when a person self-identifies as a group member.6  A social identity 
results from a self-categorization process, through which an individual 
cognitively groups himself/herself with others, based on perceived similarities 
(Turner 1987a; Hogg 1987).7  Tajfel and Turner (1986) describe this process as a 
transition, through which a person stops thinking like a unique individual and 
instead begins to think like a representative of a group.  As described by Brewer 
and Schneider (1990), there is “a fundamental depersonalization of the self-
concept” (170).   
Evidence from psychology experiments suggests that self-categorization 
and the accompanying psychological phenomena are quite basic human processes.  
Scholars have explored the necessary and sufficient conditions for self-
categorization, or the formation of a “psychological group.”  (For a review, see 
                                                 
6 Note that in a team setting, the terms team identity and social identity are synonymous. 
7 Strictly speaking, self-categorization theory (Turner 1987a) and Social Identity Theory (Abrams 
and Hogg 1990) emerge from distinct traditions of social psychological research.  While self-
categorization theory examines the causes, processes, and consequences of psychological group 
formation, Social Identity Theory focuses more on ingroup/outgroup comparisons and intergroup 
behavior.  However, because these bodies of literature are so interrelated, there is an accepted 
tendency to view them as one composite body of theory.  I take such an approach, including self-
categorization theory under the broad umbrella of Social Identity Theory. 
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Turner 1987b.)  Because of their focus on the minimal conditions required for 
psychological group formation, these studies are collectively described as 
applying the “minimal group paradigm.”  They have examined the roles of 
conditions such as interdependence, interpersonal attraction, and physical 
proximity in invoking the self-categorization process.  Notably, none of these 
factors appear to be necessary for self-categorization to occur.  On the contrary, 
simply dividing people into groups, even on an explicitly random basis, is 
sufficient for inducing self-categorization (Locksley et al. 1980).   
While individuals readily group themselves and others into various social 
categories, it is important to note that these categorizations do not always 
dominate the individual’s self-concept.  Tajfel and Turner (1986) distinguish 
between a personal identity and a social identity, arguing that only one of these 
identities can be dominant at a time.  Thus, while an individual may have 
categorized himself/herself with others, this cognitive grouping (or social identity) 
will only affect behavior to the extent that it dominates the personal identity in the 
individual’s self-concept.  Shortly (in the “Antecedents of Social Identity” 
section), I will discuss the factors that determine the degree to which a social 
identity is adopted. 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL IDENTITY 
Early work on social identity and self-categorizations focused primarily on 
issues of ethnic identity and discrimination, but this theory has more recently been 
applied in an organizational context (e.g., Ashforth and Mael 1989; Hogg and 
Terry 2000).  Most organizational applications of Social Identity Theory are 
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theoretical in nature, with only limited empirical research conducted to test the 
implications of this theory for organizational issues.  Ashforth and Mael (1989) 
propose a three-pronged agenda for future applications of Social Identity Theory 
to organizational research.  First, they acknowledge that individuals in 
organizations have multiple (often conflicting) identities, and suggest that 
research should focus on identification with salient subgroups (e.g., teams, 
functional roles, etc.) as well as with the overall organization.  Second, they 
propose that organizational scholars should conduct research to identify both the 
antecedents and consequences of organizational identification.  Finally, Ashforth 
and Mael (1989) call for further research on the effect of organizational 
identification on the internalization of the organization’s goals and values.   
Lembke and Wilson (1998) respond to the first of Ashforth and Mael’s 
(1989) three proposals, suggesting that Social Identity Theory is a particularly 
appropriate theory for understanding one particular aspect of identification in 
organizations – identification with teams.  Lembke and Wilson (1998) criticize 
prior research on team processes, arguing that traditional approaches to 
understanding teams (e.g., McGrath 1984) fail to consider the cognitive changes 
that are associated with team formation.  Social Identity Theory, on the other 
hand, would suggest that a key component of team processes is the formation of a 
psychological team, a salient shared categorization of team members.   
Ashforth and Mael’s (1989) second proposed avenue of research is an 
examination of the antecedents and consequences of social identification, as 
discussed in the following two sections. 
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ANTECEDENTS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 
As described earlier, self-categorization is a natural human process, 
conducted automatically and with relatively little prompting.  As a result, each 
individual simultaneously holds a number of self-categorizations (Ashforth and 
Mael 1989).  For example, employees assigned to cross-functional teams may 
simultaneously self-categorize themselves with fellow team members and with 
individuals filling similar functional roles (engineering, accounting, etc.) on other 
teams.  The adoption of a social identity may be described in terms of the salience 
of these self-categorizations.  Specifically, when one particular self-categorization 
becomes more salient than others (and more salient than the individual’s personal 
identity), then a person is described as having adopted that particular social 
identity.8  What factors determine when an individual adopts a particular social 
identity?  (Or alternatively, what makes a particular self-categorization salient?)  
A number of factors have been suggested. 
Turner (1987a) proposes that situational cues are important for 
determining the relative salience of competing self-categorizations.  For example, 
the degree to which an accountant on a cross-functional team identifies with other 
team members vs. other accountants may be in part determined by whether his/her 
office is physically located adjacent to other team members or to other 
accountants.  Lembke and Wilson (1998) posit that the degree of team identity 
will also depend on the perceived status of the team.  This proposal is supported 
                                                 
8 While the concept of adopting a particular social identity may initially be interpreted as a 
discrete choice, Lembke and Wilson (1998) argue that social identification is not an “all or 
nothing” phenomenon; instead, the extent of social identification is a matter of degree. 
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by empirical evidence – in a field study of the U.K. social worker strike of the 
1970s, Breakwell (1983) reports that as the power of a group decreased, group 
members began to identify with various subgroups, fragmenting the larger group 
in a psychological attempt to achieve higher status.  Ashforth and Mael (1989) 
also propose several antecedents of identification, including the distinctiveness of 
the group’s values and practices, the salience of outgroups, and the clarity of the 
group’s boundaries. 
In one of the very few empirical investigations of social identity in a team 
setting, Scott (1997) explores the antecedents of team identification.  She 
conducted a field study of 42 product and process development teams employed 
at a large manufacturing firm.  Her results suggest that the level of team identity is 
positively related to the proportion of time that members spend on team-related 
activities and to the project leader’s status in the organization, and is negatively 
related to the level of functional diversity on the team.  Thus, a cross-functional 
team engaged in a temporary or part-time project is less likely to establish a 
strong team identity than is a full-time production team.  
The studies discussed above document the characteristics that are likely to 
influence the level of social identity.  The following section, in turn, discusses the 
consequences of social identity.   
CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 
I am aware of only one study addressing the effects of social identity in an 
accounting setting.  King (2002) demonstrates that a sense of social identity 
among auditors mitigates their tendency to over rely on clients’ non-binding 
 28 
communication.  More specifically, King (2002) experimentally investigates 
interactions among auditors and their clients, finding that clients use “cheap talk” 
to create trust in their auditors.  King (2002) refers to this increased level of trust 
as a “self-serving bias,” an unconscious bias created by psychology-based 
phenomena.  The clients are able to capitalize on the auditors’ trust by committing 
higher levels of fraud.  King’s (2002) results suggest that the auditors’ self-
serving bias can be mitigated by increasing the salience of the auditors’ group 
membership, and by encouraging the development of social norms.  The results of 
King’s (2002) study are not directly applicable to the current study, because they 
do not focus on a team setting, where gains are possible through coordinated 
behavior.  King’s (2002) study nonetheless provides evidence of the important 
role social identity plays in affecting behavior in accounting settings. 
Work in social psychology has explored the processes through which 
social identity affects behavior.  When a particular social identity is adopted, 
several effects occur.  First, members of the social category (the ingroup) are 
perceived as more heterogeneous than members of other categories (the outgroup) 
(Lorenzi-Cioldi and Doise 1990).  Second, members of the ingroup are mutually 
attracted to one another and show favoritism for members of the ingroup over 
those of the outgroup (Brewer 1979).  Finally, and most importantly for the 
current study, the unit of analysis for decision making shifts away from the 
individual and toward the group as a whole (Tajfel and Turner 1986).   
When an individual adopts a social identity, s/he cognitively represents the 
social group as one entity rather than as a collection of separate entities.  This 
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change of perspective affects how information is interpreted and how decisions 
are made (Lembke and Wilson 1998).  In a team setting, for example, the shift 
from an individual to a team perspective will change team members’ beliefs about 
how their actions affect outcomes (Wech et al. 1998).  In a highly identified team, 
team members are likely to believe that they can influence outcomes through 
collective vs. individual actions.  The result is that team members begin to see 
their actions and outcomes as being interrelated with others on the team.  Thus, in 
making choices, they are more likely to coordinate their actions and to focus on 
joint rather than individual outcomes (Brewer 1979). 
The effect of social identity on decision making has been observed in the 
context of social dilemmas.9  These social dilemma experiments are particularly 
relevant for the current study, because both the horizontal and vertical incentive 
systems being investigated have features that relate to social dilemmas.  
Specifically, in a social dilemma, it is individually rational for each person to 
defect (behave opportunistically), but each person is better off if all choose to 
cooperate than if all choose to defect (Dawes 1980).  As will be explained in 
Chapter 4, the horizontal and vertical incentive systems demonstrate a similar 
tension between individual rationality and social welfare.  
Brewer (1979) first suggested that social identification affects behavior in 
social dilemmas, and this suggestion was followed by several empirical 
investigations of the premise.  One of the earliest is a study by Kramer and 
                                                 
9 While the papers presented here are all experimental, some related field studies have found 
similar results.  For example, Everett et al. (1992) report that on women’s swimming teams, team 
cohesion (a concept not identical to but closely related to social identity) results in a lower 
incidence of social loafing (the withholding of effort as individual effort becomes less 
identifiable). 
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Brewer (1984), who conducted three experiments investigating a commons 
dilemma problem involving a replenishable resource.10  The group as a whole was 
provided with a resource pool of points, and participants were given two goals:   
1) to individually accumulate as many points as possible from the resource pool, 
and 2) to make the resource pool last as long as possible, in order to maximize the 
number of periods over which points could be accumulated.  During each period 
of the experiment, each participant was allowed to deduct (or “harvest”) up to 10 
points from the resource pool.  Following the deductions the pool was replenished 
at a variable rate averaging 1.1.  Kramer and Brewer (1984) report that the 
depletion rate was lower when participants’ mutual membership in some 
superordinate group (either naturally occurring or experimentally manipulated) 
was made salient to them.11   
Several factors limit the generalizability of Kramer and Brewer’s (1984) 
results.  For example, the participants could not interact or communicate with one 
another.  Nor could they directly observe the harvesting decisions of other 
participants.  (In fact, half of the participants in their studies were bogus 
participants, group members who were presumably participating from a remote 
location, but who were actually pre-programmed dummies.)  It is reasonable to 
conjecture that these factors may interact with the primary independent variable 
of interest, social identity (as represented by salient group membership).  Thus, 
                                                 
10 The replenishable resource task was patterned after that developed by Messick et al. (1983). 
11 The superordinate group designation was made salient through instructional wording in two 
experiments.  In the third experiment, salience was achieved through a “common fate” 
manipulation.  Participants accumulated points throughout the experiment, which were converted 
to currency at the conclusion of the session.  To make the group designation salient, a common 
conversion rate was determined for all members of the group, based on a random draw at the end 
of the session. 
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the conclusions of this study may not generalize to settings involving social 
interaction, communication, and mutual observation.   
Brewer and Kramer (1986) continued this stream of research in an 
experimental investigation of the interaction between decision framing and social 
identification in a social dilemma.12  They presented their participants with social 
dilemmas that were economically equivalent but that were framed in two different 
ways.  In the commons dilemma condition, the problem was framed as a 
replenishable resource problem, similar to that used by Kramer and Brewer 
(1984).  In the public goods condition, by contrast, participants were asked to 
make contributions to (rather than harvest from) the common pool.   
Based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1984), Brewer and 
Kramer (1986) predicted that participants confronted with a commons dilemma 
would behave more cooperatively than those confronted with a public goods 
problem.  The evidence supports this prediction.  However, Brewer and Kramer 
(1986) also report several important interactive effects among decision frame, 
social identity, and group size.  Of most importance, in large groups, the effect of 
social identity on the level of cooperation was different under the two decision 
frames.  The behavior of participants in the commons dilemma condition was 
consistent with prior evidence – social identity (manipulated as salient group 
membership) led to higher levels of cooperation (lower depletion of the resource).  
However, participants in the public goods condition actually cooperated less when 
their mutual membership in a superordinate group was made salient.  Brewer and 
                                                 
12 Similarly to Kramer and Brewer (1984), social identity was induced using a common fate 
manipulation. 
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Kramer (1986) cannot fully explain this paradoxical result, but they argue that it 
demonstrates the very complex relationships that exist among the variables 
investigated in their study.  As with their earlier work, personal interaction, 
communication, and decision observation were not allowed, limiting the 
generalizability of their results. 
Wit and Wilke (1992) investigated the effect of social identity on behavior 
in several types of social dilemmas (prisoner’s dilemma, chicken dilemma, and 
trust dilemma). They report that salient group membership resulted in higher 
levels of cooperation in all three games.13  These experiments differed from those 
performed by Kramer and Brewer (1984) and Brewer and Kramer (1986), in that 
all of the participants were real – there were no bogus participants at remote 
locations. However, as in the earlier experiments, personal interaction, 
communication, and decision observation were not allowed.  Notably, Wit and 
Wilke’s (1992) experiment involved only a one-shot game, not multiple decisions 
over time.   
While the social dilemma research discussed to this point focused 
primarily on the behavioral effects of social identity on cooperative behavior, De 
Cremer and van Gugt (1998) aimed at understanding the psychological processes 
through which these effects occur.  In a public goods experiment, they report that 
social identity increased contributions, and that this effect was mediated by self-
efficacy (the perception that one’s actions have a significant effect on the group’s 
outcome) rather than by mutual trust.  This experiment was conducted in a 
                                                 
13 Similarly to Kramer and Brewer (1984) and Brewer and Kramer (1986), social identity was 
induced using a common fate manipulation. 
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manner similar to those conducted by Kramer and Brewer (1984), in the use of 
dummy group members and the prohibition of interaction, communication, and 
observation. 
Clearly, there is ample evidence on the effect of social identity on 
cooperation in social dilemmas.  However, as described above, the setting for 
much of this research has omitted many of the institutional features common in 
firms and of interest to the current study.14  Most importantly, the current research 
deals specifically with teams and the use of mutual monitoring in incentive 
contracting.  Prior studies, on the other hand, do not allow participants to interact 
or to monitor one another’s decisions.  Further, the current research is aimed at 
understanding the role of communication in affecting decisions in a teamwork 
setting, whereas prior research did not allow for communication among the 
participants.  
The current study extends these basic findings on the effects of social 
identity to the setting of a teamwork environment, exploring the impact of team 
identity on the effectiveness of two types of financial incentive systems.  Thus, 
while prior studies have documented the characteristics that influence the level of 
team identity, I report on the consequences of team identity, adding links in the 
causal chain from team and environmental characteristics to incentive 
effectiveness. 
                                                 
14 These abstractions from the organizational environment are important to the extent that other 
factors interact with social identity in affecting behavior.  Such interactions are reasonable for 
such variables as mutual observability and communication.  For example, if participants are able 
to observe each other’s decisions, social norms and opportunities for retribution may be sufficient 
to induce cooperative behavior regardless of the level of social identity.  Social identity might thus 
increase cooperation only in the absence of mutual observability. 
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A NOTE ON TEAM COHESION 
While this study uses the construct of team identity to analyze the effect of 
social ties on the effectiveness of financial incentive systems, an alternate 
construct, team cohesion, could have been used instead.  Festinger (1950) defined 
group cohesion as “the resultant forces which are acting on the members to stay in 
a group” (p. 274).  While a number of different definitions have been proposed, 
the most important component of team cohesion is a mutual attraction among 
team members.  The key difference between team identity and team cohesion is 
that team identity is an attraction to the concept of the group itself, whereas 
cohesion is interpersonal in nature.  That is, an individual could be highly 
identified with a group, based solely on a salient shared categorization, without 
knowing individual members of the group.  However, for cohesion to exist, the 
members of the group must know and be attracted to one another. 
In a team setting, team identity and team cohesion are likely to be closely 
related.  This is because one of the consequences of team identity is that team 
members see other members of the team as more attractive.  A number of studies 
have examined the effect of social identification on interpersonal attraction, 
demonstrating that this attraction is a direct result of the self-categorization 
process.  (For a review, see Hogg 1987.)  Thus, the factors that lead to highly 
identified teams will indirectly lead to highly cohesive teams as well.  
As discussed earlier, the literature on social identification has only 
recently been applied to an organizational setting.  However, there is a rich 
history of psychology studies examining the relationship between team cohesion 
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and team effectiveness.  While there is intuitive appeal to a link between cohesion 
and performance, empirical evidence on this link is mixed.  (For a review, see 
Mullen and Copper, 1994).  A number of studies have demonstrated situations 
where team cohesion is not related or is even negatively related to team 
performance.  While the current study’s theory is based on social identification, 
not cohesion, the study’s findings may provide insight into the mixed results in 
the cohesion literature as well.  As developed later, I propose that social identity 
may have either a positive or negative impact on the effectiveness of a financial 
incentive system (and thus on team performance), depending on some specific 
attributes of the system.  If the behavioral implications of team cohesion and team 
identification are similar, then the mixed results in the cohesion literature may be 
at least in part due to a similar interaction between cohesion and the incentive 
system. 
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Chapter 4:  Model Development 
THE MODEL  
In this section, I introduce a model of team production, including the 
opportunity for mutual monitoring. I then demonstrate how each type of incentive 
system (vertical vs. horizontal) may be used in this setting.  Consider two risk 
neutral and effort averse agents (a and b) engaged in joint production over n 
periods.  The analytic papers (AFG 1997 and Ma 1988) used as a basis for this 
model assume risk aversion.  In fact, if the agents were risk neutral there would be 
a trivial solution to the problem (selling the firm to the agents.)  In this 
experimental setting, however, the agents’ risk preferences are not related to the 
hypothesized effects, and therefore, I assume risk neutrality for ease of exposition 
and operationalization.  I control for risk preferences by basing experimental 
payments on the expected values of the stochastic distributions.   
I will first focus on the single-period setting, and then extend the 
discussion to n periods.  Joint production in this context means that each agent i 
selects an effort level ei ∈ {shirk, work} and that output x ∈ {high, low} is a 
function of these effort choices.  Specifically, x = ƒ(ea,eb,θ), where θ  is a random 
variable representing uncertainty in the production process.  As reflected in θ, 
output is stochastically related to the agents’ effort levels, resulting in the 
conditional probability distribution depicted in Table 1.  Note that real-world 
teams engaged in joint production are likely to experience gains from synergy.  
However, the use of mutual monitoring is not affected by whether or not such 
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gains exist.  Therefore, to simplify the experimental setting, the conditional 
probability distribution used here is linear and additive in effort, incorporating no 
synergies into the production process. 
For the remainder of this document, I suppress θ and focus on the resultant 
conditional probability distribution, p(xj|ea,eb), the probability that output is j, 
given the levels of effort selected by the two agents.  This distribution 
demonstrates that the two agents are ex-ante symmetric.  Therefore, if only one 
agent works, there is a 50% probability of achieving the high output, regardless of 
which agent is working. The principal cannot observe the actions of the agents.  
However, the agents are able to observe each other’s actions perfectly, so there is 
an opportunity for mutual monitoring. 
Each agent i maximizes expected utility ui = g(ei,mi), which is increasing 
in monetary wages (mi) and decreasing in effort (ei).  This function is additively 
separable in its two operands.  As is common in many experimental studies, I 
make the simplifying assumption that utility can be measured in dollars.  
Therefore, the utility function can be represented as ui = mi - c(ei), where c(ei) is a 
function converting effort levels to costs.15  Assume that the principal prefers each 
agent to work (w) rather than shirk (s).16  However, c(w) > c(s) due to effort 
aversion, so ceteris paribus, the agents will both prefer shirking.  Next, I will 
explore the use of two types of incentive systems to induce the agents to work in 
this setting. 
                                                 
15 As discussed by Baiman [1982], agency theory defines effort as a task that is controlled by the 
agent, results in disutility, and is correlated positively with output. 
16 In this study, I treat the principal and the incentive system exogenously.  Thus, all analysis is 
directed to the two agents’ subgame.   
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THE VERTICAL INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
The vertical incentive system used in this paper is based loosely on the 
model proposed by Ma (1988).  Under this scheme, the principal bases agent i’s 
pay on his/her effort level, as explicitly reported by the other agent.17  But how 
does the incentive scheme ensure that the agents report truthfully?  One costless 
method (similar to that proposed by Ma) is the use of lotteries.  Specifically, in 
accusing another agent of shirking, the accusing agent agrees to accept an output-
based lottery that is valuable only if the other agent did in fact shirk.  
Unfortunately, this solution relies on a basic assumption not met in my model.  
Ma (1988, 558) assumes that each unique pair of actions by the two agents leads 
to a unique probability distribution of outputs.  As mentioned earlier, this is not 
the case in the current model, because when only one agent works, the symmetric 
distribution of outputs does not depend on which agent is working.   
As a simpler alternative to achieve the same objective, the firm could 
employ an auditor to ensure truthful reporting.  The auditor would be called only 
if one agent accused the other of shirking.  The accusing agent would then be 
rewarded (penalized) if the auditor determined that his/her accusation was truthful 
(false).  One apparent disadvantage of this method is that the principal would have 
to pay the auditor, making it a costly solution.  However, the unique subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium is for each agent to work and to report truthfully the 
other agent’s effort.  Therefore, in equilibrium the auditor is never called, and the 
off-equilibrium possibility of an audit is sufficient to induce truthful reporting by 
                                                 
17 In Ma’s (1988) original model, the incentive scheme is asymmetric, with one agent reporting 
both agents’ efforts, and the other verifying the first agent’s report. 
 39  
both agents.  In this study, I do not specify a method for ensuring truthful 
reporting, but instead generalize this aspect of the model.  That is, I assume that if 
an agent accuses the other of shirking, the accusing agent will receive a positive 
utility payment (β) if the other agent actually did shirk and a negative utility 
payment (γ) if the other agent actually worked. 
Under this incentive scheme, agent i’s wages mi have two additive 
components – effort pay and reporting pay.  Formally, mi = Ei + Ri, where: 
 Ei  (effort pay) =  ûi + c(w)   if ri = work   (1) 
   ûi + c(s) - δ  if ri = shirk   
Ri (reporting pay) =       if rβ
δ
                                                
j = shirk and ej = shirk (2) 
   γ   if rj = shirk and ej = work  
0  otherwise (i.e., if rj = work) 
ri ∈ {shirk, work} is agent i’s effort, as reported by agent j  
 ≥ β > 0; γ  < 018 
i ≠ j 
Intuitively, effort pay represents wages for effort as reported by the other 
agent, and each agent will be paid his/her reservation utility ûi (plus an amount 
equal to the disutility of effort) if the report indicates that s/he has worked.   If the 
report indicates that s/he shirked, a penalty of δ is assessed.  Reporting pay is the 
wage component that induces truthful reporting, because it pays a bonus (penalty) 
to the agent who accuses his/her teammate of shirking if that report is truthful 
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δ
18 The requirement that δ ≥ β is more a practical requirement than a technical requirement.  If β > 
, then a collusive opportunity would exist for the agents to increase their payoffs by agreeing to 
each shirk and then report truthfully.  This collusive outcome (not a Nash equilibrium) is easily 
avoided by adding this constraint. 
(false).  In this study, the following specific parameters are used, resulting in the 
extensive form game tree found in Figure 1. 
ûi =  $10.0019 




                                                
 = $10.00 
 =  $10.00 
 =  -$20.00. 
This game can be solved by backward induction, resulting in the unique 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which each player works and each player 
reports truthfully.  This will result in each agent receiving his/her reservation 
utility of $10.00.  Further, if this game is repeated a finite number of times, the 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the n-period game will have the 
agents working and reporting truthfully in each period (Gibbons 1992, 84).  This 
is a first-best result, because the agents do not take on any risk (at equilibrium, the 
agents will receive exactly their reservation utilities each period, regardless of the 
output produced).20   
While economic theory predicts the Nash equilibrium strategy of working 
and truth telling, an examination of Figure 1 reveals that this solution is not Pareto 
optimal.  Both agents can improve their outcomes if they coordinate their actions, 
 
19 It is not necessary that the participants’ reservation utilities exactly equal $10.  In the 
laboratory, it is only important that the reward structure achieve Smith’s (1982) dominance 
precept, meaning that it must dominate any subjective, non-monetary costs or values that the 
subjects hold for participating in the experiment.  
20 The distinction between first-best and second-best solutions is important, because agency costs 
are greater when the agents take on risk (as they do in a second-best solution).  However, risk 
preferences are not the focus of this laboratory study, and so I control for risk preferences by 
basing experimental payments on the expected values of the stochastic distributions. 
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each shirking and then falsely reporting that the other has worked.  This collusive 
outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, because both agents have strict incentives to 
report truthfully.  However, Social Identity Theory suggests some circumstances 
favoring such an outcome.  This idea will be explored in the next chapter, but first 
I will introduce the second type of incentive system – the horizontal incentive 
system.  
THE HORIZONTAL INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
The horizontal incentive system presented here is based on that of AFG 
(1997).  Their approach is to have the principal tie each agent’s pay to the team 
output.  A fundamental issue with team output-based pay is the opportunity for 
social loafing (the withholding of effort as individual effort becomes less 
identifiable) (Kidwell and Bennett 1993).  To prevent social loafing, AFG (1997) 
rely on the ability of the agents to monitor each other’s efforts and to punish each 
other for shirking.  This threat of punishment is a type of peer pressure, as 
conceptualized by Kandel and Lazear (1992).  In general, punishment can take on 
many forms, ranging from informal social sanctions to more formalized 
disciplinary procedures.  In the AFG (1997) two-period model, the threat to 
punish takes the form of a tit-for-tat strategy.  That is, each agent works in the 
first period and then works in the second period only if the other agent worked in 
the first period.   
The principal provides output-based team incentives in Period 1, meaning 
that each agent’s compensation is increasing in team output and that each agent 
prefers both agents working to both shirking.  Specifically,  
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mi =  ûi + c(w) + λ1      if x = high (3) 
ûi + c(w) + λ1 -
w)w,|p(low







= , and    
  = an arbitrarily small increment. ε
The subscript on λ refers to the period.  This scheme is designed to ensure 
that each agent earns exactly his/her reservation wage in expectation when both 
agents work.  The conditional probability distribution and the definitions and 
values of ûi, c(s), and c(w) are the same as presented earlier for the vertical 
incentive system.  The constraint on λ1  assures that each agent prefers both agents 
working to both shirking, and requires that λ1 = $5.00 + ε.   I set ε = $1.00.  Using 
these parameters, if output is high (low), each agent receives compensation of 
$26.00 ($2.00), resulting in the extensive form game, presented in expected value 
terms, in Panel A of Figure 2.   
This single-period game is essentially a risky prisoner’s dilemma, in that 
the unique Nash equilibrium is for each agent to shirk, while a Pareto optimal 
outcome is for each agent to work.  If this game were repeated finitely, the unique 
Nash equilibrium for the multiple-period game would have both agents shirking 
in each period, because each agent could use backward induction to “unravel” the 
problem.  However, the principal can induce the agents to work in Period 1 by 
changing the incentive structure in Period 2.  
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In Period 2, the principal uses individual incentives rather than team 
incentives, meaning that the constraint on λ2 assures that each agent at least 
weakly prefers working, given that the other agent is working.  In doing so, the 
principal creates multiple equilibria in the Period 2 subgame.  In at least one of 
these equilibria, agent i is worse off than in the other equilibria.  Agent j can 
therefore threaten to punish agent i for not working in Period 1 by playing this 
“bad equilibrium” in Period 2.  The threat is credible, because punishing behavior 
in Period 2 is part of an equilibrium.  Because each agent has the ability to punish 
within an equilibrium, the problem no longer unravels due to backward induction.  
Thus, a punishment strategy can be maintained in a Nash equilibrium, using the 
following compensation parameters in the second period: 
 
mi =  ûi + c(w) + λ2     if x = high (4) 















Using values defined earlier, λ2 = $10.00, resulting in the extensive form 
game represented in Figure 2, Panel B.   In this final period subgame, all four 
cells represent Nash equilibria, so either agent can credibly threaten to move from 
the (work, work) equilibrium to punish deviant behavior in the prior period.  
Thus, the punishment strategy is a Nash Equilibrium in the two-period game.  
Further, it is a Nash Equilibrium in the n-period game formed by repeating the 
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two-period game n/2 times.21  Nikias (2001) provides experimental evidence that 
under certain conditions, participants do play punishment strategies when faced 
with the AFG (1997) incentive scheme. 
A natural question arises at this point.  Why doesn’t the principal use the 
Period 2 (individual) incentives in all periods?  That is, the incentives in Period 2 
do not induce social loafing, because they assure that each agent at least weakly 
prefers to work given that the other agent is working.  Further, by increasing λ2 by 
an arbitrarily small amount, the principal could assure that each agent strictly 
prefers to work given that the other agent is working.  Therefore, the principal 
could use these incentives in all periods and induce working as equilibrium 
behavior.  The reason the principal would not want to do this in a conventional 
principal-agent setting is related to risk aversion.  The individual incentives of 
Period 2 impose greater risk on the agents than do the team incentives of Period 1.  
For example, using the parameters of this study, in Period 1, if output is high 
(low), each agent receives compensation of $26.00 ($2.00), whereas in Period 2, 
high (low) output results in compensation of $30.00 (-$10.00).  While I have 
assumed risk neutrality for simplification, real-world agents would likely be risk 
averse, requiring greater compensation under higher-risk incentives.  Therefore, 
the principal would want to use the higher-risk individual incentives only as 
needed to provide for a punishment opportunity, as described by AFG (1997).  
                                                 
21 This punishment strategy can take any of several forms, including a tit-for-tat strategy, a grim-
trigger strategy, or some other type of penal code.  From a technical perspective, the punishment 
strategy could be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in an n-period game by using the individual 
(punishment phase) incentives only in period n.  However, to increase the salience of the 
opportunity for punishment, I use the individual incentives in all even-numbered periods.  
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While the outcome of each agent playing the tit-for-tat or some other 
punishment strategy is a Nash equilibrium, it is not unique.  For example, the 
undesirable (from the principal’s perspective) outcome in which both agents shirk 
each period is also an equilibrium.  However, the Nash equilibrium in which both 
agents use a punishment strategy Pareto dominates all other Nash equilibria.  
What can the principal do to ensure that the agents achieve the desirable (and 
Pareto optimal) result of working each period?  The answer to this question likely 
relates to the level of team identity, as developed in the next chapter. 
In summary, agency theorists have proposed two different approaches 
through which the principal can take advantage of peer observations – the vertical 
approach and the horizontal approach.  While similar results theoretically can be 
obtained from either approach, the following chapter explores why the social 
psychological concept of team identity is likely to differentially affect outcomes 
under the two systems. 
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Table 1 – Conditional Probability Distribution for Output 
 







Both Shirk 75% 25% 
Agent 1 Shirks / Agent 2 Works 50% 50% 
Agent 1 Works / Agent 2 Shirks 50% 50% 
Both Work 25% 75% 
 
 
Note:  Three assumptions are made regarding this conditional distribution –  
 
1) First-order stochastic dominance. 
2) The “non-moving support” condition (the stipulation that the support of x 
(output) is the same for any combination of efforts by the two agents 
(Holmstrom 1979)).    
3) Symmetry – this assumption is not required, but is made for simplicity.  
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Figure 1 – Vertical Incentive Structure 
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Figure 2 – Horizontal Incentive Structure 
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Chapter 5:  Hypotheses 
HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2 – THE EFFECT OF TEAM IDENTITY ON INCENTIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
As suggested earlier, my primary prediction is an interaction between the 
incentive system and the level of team identity, such that the effectiveness of an 
incentive system may be either enhanced or degraded by a strong team identity.  
This prediction is hypothesized formally in H1, following a description of the 
process resulting in this interaction.  The process is illustrated in Figure 3.   
The reasoning originates with a self-categorization process, by which 
members of highly identified teams cognitively group themselves with their 
teammates.  As a result, the team, rather than the individual, becomes the primary 
cognitive unit of analysis.  In considering strategy choices, the team members will 
become more attuned to the interrelatedness of their actions, focusing on the ways 
in which they can jointly affect outcomes.  This change in cognitive focus will 
lead them to choose strategies that are mutually beneficial (or cooperative) in 
nature.  Thus, the cognitive change that defines team identity will have a direct 
effect on the level of cooperation achieved.  In other words, highly identified 
teams are more likely than other teams to reach Pareto optimal outcomes. 
Team identity also operates through an indirect effect, resulting from the 
efforts of highly identified teams to actively coordinate their strategies.  
Coordination is enhanced by communication (Cooper et al. 1992), so it follows 
that highly identified teams will engage in greater communication, leading to an 
increased probability of arriving at cooperative (Pareto optimal) outcomes.   
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Thus, I predict that team identity, operating through both direct (cognitive) 
and indirect (communication-mediated) effects, will lead to greater cooperation.  
However, cooperation means different things under the two incentive systems.  
Recall that under the vertical incentive system, pay is based on reported effort.  
This opens the possibility for collusion between the two agents – they can each 
shirk and report that the other worked.  This collusive outcome is not a Nash 
equilibrium, because each agent has strict incentives to report truthfully.  
However, the collusive outcome is Pareto superior (from the agents’ point of 
view) to the principal’s preferred outcome of working and truthful reporting.  
Under the vertical incentive system, therefore, agents who cooperate (i.e., 
collude) are likely to choose lower effort levels than those who choose their 
strategies independently. 
The horizontal incentive system, on the other hand, bases pay on team 
output and offers no opportunities for collusion.  Indeed, under this system, the 
principal assumes that the agents will side contract to the principal’s advantage.  
There are a number of equilibria (e.g., both agents shirk each period) in the 
multiple-period game, but the cooperative (Pareto optimal) outcome is the one 
preferred by the principal.  In this equilibrium, each agent plays a punishment 
strategy, with the result that each agent works each period.  Under the horizontal 
incentive system, therefore, agents who cooperate are likely to choose higher 
effort levels than those who choose their strategies independently. 
In summary, team identity should lead to greater cooperation, which can 
have either a positive or negative effect on effort, depending on the incentive 
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system in place.  This is the primary hypothesis, pictured in Figure 4 and stated in 
the alternate form. 
H1: The incentive system will interact with team identity, such that the 
effectiveness (in terms of the level of effort elicited) of the 
horizontal incentive system will be enhanced by a strong team 
identity, while the effectiveness of the vertical incentive system 
will be degraded by a strong team identity. 
The second hypothesis focuses on the process resulting in the predicted 
interaction between team identity and the incentive system. Specifically, H2 tests 
the two paths through which team identity is expected to influence the 
effectiveness of the incentive system – the direct, or cognitive, path, and the 
indirect, or communication-mediated, path. 
H2: Team identity will have both a direct and an indirect effect on the 
effectiveness of the incentive system (with communication acting 
as a mediating variable). 
Note that while H1 predicts that the total effect of team identity on effort 
will depend on the incentive system, H2 dissects the total effect into its 
components.  Therefore, H2 implicitly predicts that each of the component effects 
will depend on the incentive system.  
DISTINGUISHING THIS STUDY FROM PRIOR SOCIAL DILEMMA LITERATURE 
As discussed earlier in the review of the social identity literature, several 
studies have examined social identity in social dilemma settings, finding that 
highly identified groups achieve greater levels of cooperation in these games.  
One might question, therefore, the need for an experiment in the current study, 
asking why the results of prior studies wouldn’t automatically apply to the team 
incentives setting.  Thus, it is important to distinguish the contributions of this 
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study from the more generic social dilemma literature.  There are several 
important institutional features represented in the current study, leading to 
differences between the economic incentives and environmental characteristics in 
this study vs. prior studies.  Any of these differences may affect the results.  
Therefore, the social dilemma literature provides some guidance as to what one 
might expect in the current setting, but does not provide an unambiguous answer 
as to the impact of social identity on the effectiveness of horizontal and vertical 
incentive systems. 
Perhaps the most important way in which the current study is 
distinguished from the prior literature is in its reliance on mutual monitoring.  
Prior studies on social identity in a social dilemma setting (e.g., Kramer and 
Brewer 1984; Brewer and Kramer 1986) did not allow participants to observe 
each other’s actions.  In fact, as mentioned earlier, many of these studies used 
dummy participants, presumably participating from remote locations.  Thus, the 
question remains as to whether social identity will increase cooperative behavior 
when team members have the ability to monitor one another.  Specifically, it may 
be that social norms of behavior are invoked whenever participants’ actions are 
observed by one another, and that social identity will have no incremental effect 
on behavior. 
A second distinguishing feature of the current study is that it allows for 
communication.  Prior investigations of social identity in social dilemma settings 
have restricted all interactions among participants, including opportunities for 
communication.  A team setting generally creates significant opportunities for 
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communication, and so in the current study, participants are allowed to 
communicate in writing to one another. Prior studies (unrelated to social identity) 
report that allowing pre-play communication among participants increases 
cooperation in social dilemmas (Ledyard 1995).  It may be that such 
communication and social identity serve as substitutes, not complements, for one 
another.  Specifically, communication and social identity each provide 
mechanisms by which individual team members may focus their attention on team 
outcomes rather than individual outcomes.  It is possible that when team members 
have the opportunity to communicate with one another, the level of team identity 
will have no incremental effect on the level of cooperation achieved. 
While prior studies have examined the effect of communication on 
cooperation in social dilemmas, these studies have viewed communication as an 
exogenous variable, comparing the level of cooperation when communication is 
allowed to when it is prohibited.  This study, on the other hand, explores the 
endogenous nature of the communication, suggesting that the level of 
communication will be determined, at least in part, by the level of social identity.  
Thus, this study contributes to the prior literature on social identity in social 
dilemma settings by providing evidence on the mechanisms through which social 
identity affects the level of cooperation. 
Finally, and aside from the mutual monitoring and communication issues 
discussed above, there are features of these incentive systems themselves that 
distinguish them from standard social dilemmas.  For example, the vertical 
incentive system results in a two-stage game, involving effort choices followed by 
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reporting choices.   In this game, the cooperative outcome involves each person 
shirking and then falsely reporting that the other has worked.  This is different 
from a standard social dilemma, because at the time of reporting, each person 
knows exactly how much s/he is individually sacrificing by choosing to lie for a 
teammate.  (Using the parameters described in Chapter 4, once a person has 
chosen to shirk, his/her teammate must knowingly give up a reporting bonus of 10 
points in order to make the cooperative strategy choice.)  From an economic 
perspective, the fact that the vertical system is a two-stage game should not affect 
behavior.  However, from a behavioral perspective, the two-stage mechanism 
might increase the salience of individual rationality, reducing the likelihood that 
social identity will have an effect on behavior. Thus, the vertical system provides 
a boundary condition for testing the effect of social identity on cooperation in 
social dilemmas. 
The horizontal incentive system also differs in key ways from standard 
social dilemmas. In fact, the multi-period game that results from this system is not 
a social dilemma, per se.  As described earlier, a social dilemma is characterized 
by a situation where the unique Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.  This is 
not the case in the horizontal system, as the outcome that has each person playing 
a tit-for-tat strategy is both a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto optimal outcome.  
However, this solution depends entirely on the multi-period nature of the game, 
with “enforcement periods” used to sustain cooperation in earlier periods.  These 
earlier periods, standing alone, are essentially risky prisoner’s dilemmas.22 The 
                                                 
22 A prisoner’s dilemma is simply a two-person version of a social dilemma, which is usually 
taken to involve more than two participants. 
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enforcement periods create an interesting twist.  While these enforcement periods 
serve the specific purpose of increasing cooperative behavior, by creating 
opportunities for retribution, there is some possibility that their usefulness will be 
undermined by social identity.  That is, if a strong team identity reduces 
participants’ willingness to punish one another for not cooperating, it may have 
the indirect effect of reducing cooperative behavior, a result opposite of that 
found in prior research on social identity in social dilemmas. 
HYPOTHESIS 3 – THE EFFECT OF THE INCENTIVE SYSTEM ON SOCIAL 
IDENTITY 
In the discussion to this point, the incentive system and the level of team 
identity have been considered independent and exogenous factors, reflecting that 
they are the two factors that are experimentally manipulated.  However, after 
repeated interaction, a different type of relationship can arise between these two 
constructs.  Specifically, the type of incentive system is likely to affect the level 
of identity that a team achieves, because the two incentive systems emphasize 
different aspects of the agents’ relationship.  The horizontal system is geared 
toward a team mentality.  That is, the principal remains unaware of individual 
contributions and each person’s compensation is based on the team’s total output.  
The vertical system, on the other hand, eschews the cooperative spirit of a team.  
Instead, team members tattle on one another.  Individual compensation is based 
on peer reports, and team members receive bonuses for making unfavorable 
reports on their peers.  For these reasons, the type of incentive system is expected 
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to affect the team members’ feelings about one another, and thus the level of team 
identity.  This leads to the final hypothesis, pictured in Figure 5.23 
H3: After repeated interaction, individuals compensated according to 
the horizontal incentive system will experience a higher level of 
team identity than will individuals compensated according to the 
vertical incentive system. 
                                                 
23 Note that the horizontal axis of this graph represents team identity as manipulated.  The upward 
sloping lines indicate that this manipulation is expected to have a lasting effect – even after 
repeated interaction, teams formed from two members of the same color group will have greater 
ending team identity than those formed from different color groups. 
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Note that Hypothesis 1 does not predict the placement of these two lines, but 
rather the slopes.  That is, the horizontal incentive system line should be sloped 
upward, and the vertical incentive system line should be sloped downward. 
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Figure 5 – Hypothesis 3 
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Note that the horizontal axis represents beginning team identity, as manipulated in 
the experimental session, whereas the vertical axis represents ending team 




Chapter 6:  Description of Method 
This experiment uses a 2X2 (Incentive System X Team Identity) between-
subjects factorial design.  Sixteen experimental sessions were held, each involving 
eight participants recruited from graduate business classes at The University of 
Texas at Austin.  As participants arrived, they were randomly assigned to two 
groups of four, with each group identified by a different color.  For the 
instructional phase, each participant was seated with members of his/her color 
group at a table draped in the group color.  Figure 6 presents the room layout for 
the instructional phase of the experimental session. 
The wording of the instructions, along with the assigned seating by color 
and the use of colored props (table drapes, name placards, partition coverings, 
etc.), were designed to increase the salience of the color groups, thereby 
facilitating the participants’ self-categorizations into these color groups.24  The 
presence of two color groups in each session promoted this process, as prior 
research has shown that a social identity is reinforced by in-group / out-group 
comparisons (Abrams and Hogg 1990).  A partition separated the two color 
groups during the instructional phase, but this partition was placed such that each 
participant could view members of the other group simply by leaning back.  The 
administrator could be seen by members of both color groups.   
                                                 
24 The instructions in the low and high identity conditions differed in two respects.  First, they 
specified whether each person would be paired with a member of his/her own color group or the 
other color group.  Second, the teammate was referred to as “your teammate” in the high identity 
condition vs. “the other person” in the low identity condition. 
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While still seated with their color groups, participants read a scenario (see 
Appendix A), in which they were instructed to assume the roles of two division 
managers making effort (or more generally, resource allocation) decisions.  The 
scenario described the incentive system, manipulated to represent the two systems 
of interest.  Participants were told that they would be compensated in cash, based 
on their decisions and the incentive system in place.  Because risk preferences 
were not relevant to the hypotheses of this study, the stochastic element was 
eliminated, and each incentive system was presented in expected value terms.  
One objective of this study is to explore how communication 
spontaneously arises in low and high identity teams.  In order to investigate the 
level of communication, participants were told that they could communicate with 
their teammates in writing.  To prevent a potential demand effect, this instruction 
was provided verbally, instead of through the formal written instructions.  That is, 
because of the endogenous nature of the communication variable, it was important 
that the communication-related instructions be subtle, so as not to cue participants 
that they should communicate.  One concern with verbal instructions of this type 
is that the administrator might inadvertently (through the use of body language or 
intonation) encourage greater communication in some experimental conditions 
than in others.  To alleviate this concern, the administrator was unaware of the 
experimental condition at the time of verbal instructions.25 
Color groups were used to implement the first manipulated factor of team 
identity.  Teams of two were required for the actual experimental task.  In the 
                                                 
25 Experimental materials, which differed by condition, were handled only by laboratory 
assistants, and not by the administrator providing verbal instructions. 
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high identity condition, each team was formed by pairing two members from the 
same color group, whereas in the low identity condition, each team was formed 
by pairing two members from different color groups.26  For a real-world analogue 
to this manipulation, suppose that the color groups represent functional roles 
(accounting, engineering, etc.).  The high identity teams then represent cross-
functional teams, whereas the low identity teams represent uni-functional teams.   
After the participants read the instructions and the experimenter reviewed 
them (Appendix B presents the instructional slides), the members of each team 
were seated at opposite ends of a table, where they completed the experimental 
task.  For this portion of the experimental session, partitions were placed so that 
teammates could observe each other, but not other teams.  (Figure 7 presents the 
room layout for this phase of the experimental session.)  Each person’s task was 
to choose the level of resources that his/her division would provide.  Participants 
were asked to choose high or low resources, rather than to choose work or shirk, 
because of the concern that the latter labels might invoke a value judgment and 
response (Haynes and Kachelmeier 1998).  The two members of each team made 
these decisions simultaneously, circling high or low on Resource Decision Forms 
(see Figure 8).  The experimenter then showed each participant the form 
completed by his/her teammate, capturing the notion of mutual monitoring.  The 
Resource Decision Form was also the primary tool for intra-team communication, 
as participants were told that in addition to circling “high” or “low” on the form, 
                                                 
26 While it may seem improbable that ad-hoc assignments to color groups would engender a sense 
of group identity, psychology studies on this “minimal group paradigm” are quite robust.  
Favoritism for in-groups over out-groups, even for explicitly random groups, has been 
demonstrated in numerous studies (Turner 1987b). 
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they could write whatever else they would like.  In the vertical incentive system, 
each participant also submitted a Report Form (see Figure 9), revealing (either 
truthfully or not) the level of effort selected by his/her teammate.   
Each session included 20 periods.27  Finally, participants completed a 
post-experimental questionnaire (see Appendix C), including demographic 
questions as well as questions aimed at capturing process-related variables.
                                                 
27 For the vertical system, this entailed 20 replications of the one-period game, while for the 
horizontal system, it entailed 10 replications of the two-period game. 
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Figure 6 – Room Layout for Instructional Phase 
 























Figure 7 – Room Layout for Task Phase 
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Figure 9 – Report Form 
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Chapter 7:  Results 
In this chapter, I present analysis for the three primary hypotheses, as well 
as supplemental analyses on contingent decision making and trends over time. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, STATISTCAL ASSUMPTIONS, AND MANIPULATION 
CHECKS 
The analysis presented here represents the decisions of 128 participants, 
who each spent approximately one hour on the study.  Average compensation for 
participants in the vertical condition was $26.97.  The horizontal system does not 
offer profitable opportunities for off-equilibrium collusion.  Therefore, 
participants in this condition were paid an extra $10.00 to equalize average pay 
across conditions.28 The adjusted average compensation under the horizontal 
system was $28.43.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics.  The primary statistical processes 
used in this study, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Structural Equations-
based Path Analysis, assume that all measured variables are normally distributed.  
Therefore, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality was conducted for the 
primary variables – effort, communication, and ending team identity.29  This 
procedure tests the null hypothesis that the distribution is normally distributed, so 
a non-significant result suggests that the assumption of normality is met.  The 
results of this test are presented in Table 3.   
                                                 
28 This adjustment was announced at the conclusion of the session. 
29 The specific measures used for these constructs are discussed below in conjunction with the 
hypothesis tests.   
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For all four of the experimental conditions, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the total effort variable is normally 
distributed.  Thus, the assumption of normality is met for this variable.  The 
communication variable, on the other hand, differs significantly from a normal 
distribution in three of the four conditions.  Therefore, the statistical tests using 
this variable (see Hypothesis 2 below) will be carefully checked for robustness.  
The ending team identity variable violates the assumption of normality in only 
one of the four conditions (vertical, high identity).  This is a relatively minor 
violation, and the method of ANOVA is known to be robust to violations of 
normality (Maxwell and Delaney 1989, 109).  Therefore, the statistical tests using 
this variable (see Hypothesis 3 below) are not seriously compromised. 
Another assumption of the method of ANOVA is homogeneity of 
variances across experimental conditions.  Thus, the Levene test (Levene 1960) is 
conducted to assess the homogeneity for total effort and ending team identity, the 
two primary variables for which ANOVAs are conducted.  The results of this test 
indicate violations of this assumption for both total effort (F = 3.09, p = 0.03) and 
ending team identity (F = 4.85, p < 0.01).  ANOVA is robust to violations of this 
assumption, particularly when the cell sizes are equal and not extremely small 
(less than 5) (Maxwell and Delaney 1989, 110).  Therefore, statistical tests of 
these variables should be robust.  However, as described in the tests of Hypothesis 
2 and Hypothesis 3 below, alternate measures and specifications confirm the 
robustness of statistical inferences related to these variables. 
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Because the manipulation of team identity in the experiment is fairly 
subtle, it is important to verify that this manipulation had the intended effect on 
participants’ perceptions.  Thus, a question in the post-experimental questionnaire 
(Appendix C) served as a manipulation check for the team identity variable.  A 
Likert scale question asked each person to assess the degree to which s/he had 
considered the person s/he was paired with to be a “teammate” (at the beginning 
of the experiment).  Participants in the high identity condition reported 
significantly higher numbers (F = 7.69, p < 0.01), indicating that the 
manipulation of the team identity construct was successful.  
HYPOTHESIS 1 
H1 predicts an interaction between the level of team identity and the 
incentive system. The dependent variable is the effectiveness of the incentive 
system.  This construct is operationalized as “total effort,” the cumulative number 
of times team members selected the high level of resources over the course of the 
experiment.  (Each period, a team received a score of zero if neither member 
picked high resources, one if only one member picked high resources, and two if 
both members picked high resources.)  Because under the horizontal incentive 
system, the even periods are essentially enforcement periods, aimed at eliciting 
high effort in odd periods, this analysis considers only odd periods.30  Therefore, 
this variable can take on any value between 0 and 20, with 20 representing a team 
for which each member selects high during all 10 odd periods.  Figure 10 
provides graphical results, and Table 4 presents the results of the 2 X 2 ANOVA. 
                                                 
30 An alternate specification of effort, using all 20 periods, is analyzed later. 
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The hypothesized interaction between team identity and the incentive 
system is highly significant (F = 9.38, p < 0.01).  Furthermore, simple effects 
analysis (in Panel B) reveals that under the vertical incentive system, high identity 
teams chose lower levels of effort than low identity teams (F = 3.52, one-tailed p 
= 0.03), but that under the horizontal incentive system, high identity teams chose 
higher levels of effort than low identity teams (F = 6.03, one-tailed p < 0.01).  
Thus, the effectiveness of the vertical incentive system is degraded by a strong 
sense of team identity, while the effectiveness of the horizontal incentive system 
is enhanced by a strong sense of team identity, supporting the primary hypothesis 
of this study. 
Several tests were conducted to test the robustness of these conclusions.  
Recall that the Levene test suggested heterogeneity of variance for the total effort 
variable.  Therefore, as suggested by Conover and Iman (1981), a second 
ANOVA is conducted, using the rank of effort as the dependent variable.  The 
results of this ANOVA also reveal a significant interaction (F = 11.04, p < 0.01).  
Further, the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test verifies the simple effects 
analysis (vertical one-tailed p = 0.02, horizontal one-tailed p < 0.01). 
Next, the tests were repeated using all periods of data, rather than only odd 
periods.  This specification also results in a significant incentive system X team 
identity interaction (F = 9.57, p < 0.01).  Simple effects analysis of this alternate 
measure of total effort finds that under the vertical incentive system, high identity 
teams chose lower levels of effort than low identity teams (F = 3.57, one-tailed p 
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= 0.03), but that under the horizontal incentive system, high identity teams chose 
higher levels of effort than low identity teams (F=9.90, one-tailed p < 0.01). 
Finally, the method of generalized estimating equations (or GEE) 
developed by Diggle et al. (1994) was used to test H1.  This logistic regression 
procedure is designed specifically for analyzing longitudinal (or within-subjects) 
data where the outcomes are categorical rather than continuous.  While the 
cumulative effort measure used for the primary analysis approaches normality 
(and is not significantly different from normal, as presented in Table3), the effort 
choice is technically a categorical variable.  Thus, it is appropriate to test the 
robustness of the ANOVA with a logistic regression procedure.  The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 5.  The GEE analysis confirms the results of 
the primary analysis, finding a significant interaction between the incentive 
system and the level of team identity (Z = 2.64, p < 0.01).      
Based on these supplemental tests for robustness, I conclude that 
Hypothesis 1 is supported, and that team identity increases the effectiveness of 
horizontal incentive systems, while degrading the effectiveness of vertical 
incentive systems. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
H2 is aimed at unraveling the process by which team identity influences 
the effectiveness of incentive systems.  As represented in Figure 3, this hypothesis 
suggests that the relationship occurs through both direct (cognitive) and indirect 
(communication-mediated) effects.  This model is tested using a structural 
equations-based path analysis, which simultaneously estimates each link in the 
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model.  This method overcomes the issue of multicollinearity, which could lead to 
biased estimates if multiple regression were used to test both direct and indirect 
effects. The primary measure of fit of the model is a chi-squared statistic, which 
tests the null hypothesis that the proposed model is a good fit for the data.  This 
statistic is not statistically significant (χ2 = 0.15, p = 0.70), indicating that the 
model is indeed a good fit of the data.  This evidence is corroborated by the 
Tucker-Lewis Index, also known as the Non-normed Fit Index.  This value 
indicates the proportion of improvement of the model over a null model.  The 
value of 1.30, indicating a 130% increase, is well above the generally accepted 
cutoff value of 90% (Kline 1998, 131). 
The independent and dependent variables for this analysis are the same as 
those used in the ANOVA for H1.  However, an additional mediating variable – 
level of communication – is added to the analysis.  Recall that participants were 
allowed to share written communication with their teammates.  The level of 
communication is captured by counting the number of words written by each 
team.31  (Sample communication transcripts are presented in Appendix D.) 
The standardized path coefficients for this model are presented in Figure 
11.  H2 predicts that the incentive system will moderate the relationship between 
team identity and effort, on both its direct and indirect (communication-mediated) 
paths.  In other words, there will be interactions between the incentive system and 
both team identity and communication.  While it is relatively straightforward to 
test interactions in regression and analysis of variance techniques, it is more 
                                                 
31 While I did not conduct a formal content analysis of the communication transcripts, casual 
observation of the content suggests no differences among the experimental conditions.  The vast 
majority of communication was aimed at problem solving and coordination.  
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complicated to do so under path analysis.  When at least one of the independent 
variables is discrete, as is the case here, the generally accepted approach is the 
multi-sample approach, using nested model comparisons (Rigdon et al. 1998).  
I first assess the direct relationship between team identity and effort.  A 
path model is created to reflect the model presented in Figure 3.  This model is 
called the unrestricted model.  A second model (called the restricted model) is 
then created.  This model restricts the coefficient on the team identity-effort path 
to be equal for the two incentive systems.  (Note that in the unrestricted model, 
this coefficient is allowed to vary across the two incentive systems.)  The 
presence of an interaction is assessed by statistically comparing the fit of the 
unrestricted and restricted models.  This comparison indicates that the unrestricted 
model is a significantly better fit (χ2 = 6.06, p = 0.01) than the restricted model, 
suggesting the presence of a statistically significant interaction.  In other words, 
the direct effect of team identity on effort is different under the horizontal and 
vertical incentive systems. 
Note that this result is fundamentally different from that presented for H1.  
While H1 tested for an interaction between team identity and the incentive 
system, that test was aimed at identifying only the total effect, and did not 
subdivide it into its direct and indirect (communication-mediated) components.  
The analysis presented in this section, by contrast, is aimed at unraveling these 
two components.  Thus, the significant interaction here suggests a moderating 
influence of the incentive system on the direct effect of team identity on effort.  
Under the horizontal incentive system, a strong team identity increases the level 
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of effort (t = 2.80, one-tailed p < 0.01), whereas under the vertical incentive 
system, the direct effect of team identity is not statistically significant (t = -1.08, 
one-tailed p = 0.14).  However, there is weak evidence of a direct effect, even 
under the vertical system.  Recall that the level of effort is assessed for odd 
periods only.  If all 20 periods of data are used instead, this direct effect is 
marginally significant (t = -1.30, one-tailed p = 0.10). 
Recall that the direct effect is the result of a change in cognitive focus, 
whereby team members focus on how they can jointly, rather than individually, 
affect outcomes.  I attempted to capture this difference in cognitive focus through 
a self-report, asking in the post-experimental survey whether participants had 
been more concerned with maximizing their individual payoff or the team’s 
payoff.  Participants in the high identity condition reported no greater focus on the 
team’s payoff than did those in the low identity condition (F = 0.003, p = 0.96).   
This lack of results is not entirely surprising, however, given the robust finding 
that people have poor self-insight into their own judgment processes (Slovic and 
Lichtenstein 1971). 
I now address the indirect (communication-mediated) effect of team 
identity on effort.  As hypothesized, high team identity leads to a significant 
increase in communication (t = 2.55, one-tailed p < 0.01).  There is also a 
communication X incentive system interaction (χ2 = 3.16, p = 0.07), meaning 
that the subsequent effect of communication on effort depends on the incentive 
system in place.  Under the vertical incentive system, communication is 
negatively associated with effort (t = -1.82, one-tailed p = 0.04), suggesting that 
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team members used communication to collude with one another, leading them to 
reduce their effort levels.  Under the horizontal incentive system, however, 
communication has no significant relationship with effort (t = 0.45, p = 0.65).  
One possible explanation for this lack of association is that the relative simplicity 
of the system allowed participants to coordinate their strategies without the need 
to communicate.  Results from the post-experimental survey show that 
participants found the horizontal system less complex than the vertical incentive 
system (t = 1.40, one-tailed p = 0.08).  Together, these results suggest that under 
the vertical incentive system, the relationship between team identity and the 
effectiveness of the incentive system (in terms of the level of effort elicited) is 
partially mediated by increased communication.  However, no such mediating 
relationship is found under the horizontal incentive system.   
One might argue that the importance of communication for determining 
the level of cooperation lies not in the amount of communication but in whether 
communication occurs at all.  That is, an important determinant of the amount of 
communication may be related to individual differences, as some people are direct 
and “to the point,” whereas others are more verbose.  Thus, communication might 
alternately be operationalized as a dichotomous (yes / no) variable, instead of as 
the number of words.  To test the robustness of the model to this specification 
choice, I conducted a logistic regression, using the level of identity (0 = low, 1= 
high) as the independent variable, and a dichotomous communication variable as 
the dependent variable.  This regression finds a significant relationship between 
the level of identity and whether or not communication occurred (χ2 = 9.22, p < 
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0.01).  Further, a two-way ANOVA finds that this dichotomous communication 
variable interacts with the incentive system to affect effort (F = 16.97, p < 0.01).  
Specifically, the presence of communication (regardless of the amount of 
communication) increases effort under the horizontal system (F = 3.19, one-tailed 
p = 0.04), but decreases effort under the vertical system (F = 16.32, one-tailed p 
< 0.01).  Thus, the findings using a dichotomous communication variable are 
stronger than those using the number of words, supporting an indirect 
(communication-mediated) effect of team identity on effort for both the horizontal 
and vertical incentive systems. 
Recall that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality finds that the 
communication variable is not normally distributed.  One accepted method to 
correct for non-normality in path analysis is to conduct a bootstrapping process, 
and to use the Bollen-Stine p-value rather than the usual maximum likelihood p-
value to assess the model fit (Bollen and Stine 1993).  Bootstrapping is a 
resampling procedure, whereby multiple samples (in this case, 2,000) are drawn 
with replacement from the original dataset.  The model is then re-estimated for 
each of these samples.  Out of the 2,000 samples drawn, the model fit 1,442 of 
these samples better than the original sample.  The Bollen-Stine p-value 
(calculated as 1,442 / 2,000) of 0.72 is used to assess the model, and results in the 
conclusion that the model is indeed a good fit. 
In summary, the model predicted in H2 is fully supported under the 
vertical incentive system.  Specifically, under the vertical incentive system, the 
effort reducing effect of team identity has both a direct and an indirect 
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(communication-mediated) component.  Under the horizontal incentive system, 
the effort increasing effect of team identity also appears to have direct and 
indirect components.  Under this condition, while high identity did lead to 
increased communication, the subsequent effect of communication on effort was 
driven by the mere presence of communication and not by the amount of 
communication.  
HYPOTHESIS 3 
While the analysis to this point views team identity and the incentive 
system as two exogenous and independent constructs, H3 predicts that after 
repeated interaction, individuals compensated under the horizontal incentive 
system will experience a higher level of team identity than will individuals 
compensated under the vertical incentive system.  (That is, team identity has an 
endogenous component in addition to its exogenous manipulation.)  The 
dependent variable for this test is ending team identity, the result of a question on 
the post-experimental survey.  This question asked each participant to report on a 
Likert scale the degree to which s/he perceived the person with whom s/he was 
paired to be a teammate (at the end of the session).   This response is averaged for 
each pair, and the results are shown in Figure 12.   
A two-way (team identity X incentive system) ANOVA is reported in 
Table 6.  Team identity (representing the manipulated high or low identity 
condition) is included because this manipulation is expected to have a lasting 
effect.  That is, a team that begins the process with a high team identity is likely to 
maintain a relatively high level of identity, regardless of the incentive system in 
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place.  This is indeed the case, as teams in the high identity condition self-
reported higher ending levels of team identity than teams in the low identity 
condition (F = 6.23, one-tailed p < 0.01).  
A main effect for the incentive system (F = 2.11, one-tailed p = 0.07) also 
exists, suggesting that after repeated interaction, teams operating under the 
horizontal incentive system experienced higher levels of team identity than did 
teams operating under the vertical incentive system.  Therefore, H3 is supported.  
While the incentive system X team identity interaction term for this ANOVA is 
not significant (F = 1.70, p = 0.20), it is nonetheless important to point out that 
the incentive system main effect is driven by the low identity condition.  The 
small difference in ending team identity between the two systems in the high 
identity condition (6.06 – horizontal, 6.00 – vertical) is likely due to a ceiling 
effect.  That is, even in the low identity condition, participants under the 
horizontal system reported relatively high levels of ending team identity (5.56 out 
of a possible 7.00).  Thus, there is little room for an incremental level of ending 
team identity in the high identity condition. 
As an alternate method of evaluating H3, and to more directly test for a 
ceiling effect, I conduct a similar ANOVA using the change in self-reported team 
identity as the dependent variable.32  The results of this ANOVA, reported in 
Table 7, indicate an interaction between the level of team identity and the 
                                                 
32 In the post-experimental questionnaire, in addition to reporting their feelings at the end of the 
experiment, each participant was asked to recall on a Likert scale the degree to which s/he had 
perceived the person with whom s/he was paired to be a teammate at the beginning of the session.  
This is the same question used as a manipulation check.  A self-report such as this may not be 
entirely reliable due to demand effects, and therefore the results using this measure must be 
interpreted with caution. 
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incentive system (F = 3.27, p = 0.07).  Simple effects analysis reveals that as 
predicted, for low identity teams (i.e., teams formed from people in different color 
groups), the change in the level of identity is more positive under the horizontal 
incentive system than under the vertical incentive system (F = 4.22, one-tailed p 
= 0.02).  There is, however, evidence of a ceiling effect – for high identity teams 
(i.e., teams formed from people within the same color group), the change in the 
level of team identity does not significantly differ between the two incentive 
systems (F = 0.80, p = 0.37).  
SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS – CONTINGENT DECISION MAKING 
The analytical models behind both the vertical and the horizontal incentive 
systems assume that team members will make their decisions contingent upon the 
decisions of their teammates.  For example, in the two-stage vertical incentive 
system, each team member’s report is likely to depend on the level of effort 
chosen by his/her teammate.  Similarly, under the horizontal incentive system, 
each person’s choice in even periods (when the choice affects not his/her own 
payoff but only the teammate’s payoff) is likely to depend on the teammate’s 
choice in the prior odd period.  While this type of contingent decision making is 
not formally hypothesized, in this section I provide supplemental analysis to 
investigate the degree to which it occurred. 
Vertical Incentive System 
Figure 13 depicts and Table 8 provides numerical details on the level of 
contingent decision making under the vertical incentive system.  As discussed 
earlier, in the low identity condition, participants were more likely to pick high 
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resources (57% of choices) than low resources (43% of choices).  Further, when 
one team member picked high resources, his/her teammate was almost certain to 
truthfully report this choice – 93% (or 53 / 57) of high resource choices were 
truthfully reported).  On the other hand, in those situations when participants 
picked low resources, the teammates were less inclined to make favorable reports.  
About one-third of these teammates blew the whistle, truthfully reporting and 
collecting the 10-point reporting bonus.33  The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test finds 
the proportion of favorable reports following a teammate’s choice of high to be 
significantly greater than the proportion following a teammate’s choice of low (Z 
= -1.65, one-tailed p = 0.05).34  Thus, there is statistical evidence that participants 
in this condition (vertical incentive system, low identity) engaged in contingent 
decision making, demonstrating more willingness to report that a teammate chose 
high resources when the teammate did in fact make that choice. 
In the high identity condition, by contrast, there is no statistical evidence 
that participants under the vertical incentive system engaged in contingent 
decision making.  Despite the fact that the majority (67%) of participants in the 
high identity condition chose low resources, the peer reports in this condition 
were almost always favorable.  (Participants reported that their teammates had 
chosen high resources 87% of the time.)  Moreover, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
test shows that the participants’ peer reports did not differ significantly according 
to the actual resource decisions made by their teammates (Z = 0.28, p = 0.78). 
                                                 
33 Notably, in the low identity condition, participants were more likely to lie than to blow the 
whistle on a shirking teammate.  This represents a failure in the incentive system, which is 
designed to elicit truthful reporting. 
34 This non-parametric test is used, because proportions do not satisfy the distributional 
assumptions of a standard t-test. 
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 Together, these analyses suggest that the degree of contingent decision 
making under the vertical incentive system depends on the level of team identity, 
with low identity participants basing their reports on their teammates’ actual 
decisions and high identity participants making more uniformly favorable reports. 
Horizontal Incentive System 
Figure 14 depicts and Table 9 provides numerical details on the level of 
contingent decision making under the horizontal incentive system.  Note that the 
analysis of contingent decision making under the horizontal incentive system is 
different from the analysis presented above for the vertical incentive system.  This 
is because of the fundamental differences in structure between the two systems.  
Under the vertical incentive system, each period involved a two-stage game, with 
participants making resource decisions (Stage 1) followed by reporting decisions 
(Stage 2).  Thus, the analysis of contingent decision making analyzed the effect of 
Stage 1 decisions on Stage 2 decisions.  In contrast, each period in the horizontal 
incentive system involves only a one-stage game.  However, even periods are 
used as enforcement periods, giving participants opportunities to punish each 
other for uncooperative behavior in prior periods.  Therefore, the analysis of 
contingent decision making in the horizontal system investigates the effect of 
odd-period decisions on subsequent even-period decisions. 
In the low identity condition, participants were about equally likely to 
select high (51%) or low (49%) resources in odd periods.  Evidence suggests that 
their teammates’ choices in subsequent even periods were contingent on the odd 
period choices.  The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test provides marginal evidence that 
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participants were more likely (Z = -1.28, one-tailed p = 0.10) to pick low 
resources in even periods (thus punishing their teammates) when the teammates 
had picked low in the preceding odd period than when the teammates had picked 
high.  Twenty-seven percent (or 13 / 49) of low resource choices in odd periods 
were followed by punishment (through a teammate’s choice of low) in the 
subsequent even period.  In contrast, only 6% (or 3/51) of high resource choices 
in odd periods were followed by punishment in the subsequent even period.     
While there is evidence of contingent decision making, it is important to 
note that participants nonetheless seemed reluctant to punish their teammates.  
Most participants picked high resources in even periods, even following a choice 
of low in the previous odd period.  An examination of the post-experimental 
survey suggests that these participants were simply considering the effects of their 
individual decisions, and were not focused on the interrelatedness of their 
strategies or on the possibility of affecting each other’s choices through implicit 
side contracting and enforcement.  Specifically, when asked to describe their 
decision processes, several participants reported that they chose low resources in 
odd periods, because the cost of high effort (10 points) exceeded the benefits (6 
points).   In even periods, they were individually indifferent to high or low, so 
they picked high, knowing that such a decision would benefit their teammates. 
In the high identity condition, most participants (80%) chose high 
resources in odd periods.  The subsequent even-period choices were almost 
always high as well (96%), even in those relatively infrequent cases when a 
teammate had chosen low in the previous odd period.  Further, the Wilcoxon 
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Signed Ranks test provides no evidence of contingent decision making (Z = 0.00, 
p = 1.00).  That is, participants were no more likely to pick low resources 
following a teammate’s choice of low than following a teammate’s choice of 
high.  This lack of contingent decision making is notable, given the success of the 
incentive system in eliciting cooperative behavior in high identity teams.  That is, 
in the high identity condition, participants almost always chose high resources, 
even though it was highly unlikely that they would be punished for choosing low 
resources.  Members of low identity teams were less likely than members of high 
identity teams to select high resources, despite a greater probability of being 
punished for selecting low resources. 
The analysis presented in this section suggests that under both the vertical 
and horizontal incentive systems, members of low identity teams were more likely 
to engage in contingent decision making than were members of high identity 
teams.  Despite this fact, high identity teams achieved greater cooperation (lower 
effort under the vertical system and higher effort under the horizontal system).  
This paradoxical result suggests an important implication for firms using teams.  
Specifically, social factors may sometimes play a more important role than formal 
sanctioning and control systems in eliciting cooperative behavior among team 
members.  For example, for firms using self-managing teams, a focus on team 
building may provide greater benefits to the firm than an emphasis on the team 
members’ control over such things as compensation, promotions, and workload 
distribution.  Similarly, firms using vertical incentive systems may find that social 
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ties reduce the effectiveness of these systems, even in the presence of strong 
formal mechanisms for inducing truthful reporting. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS – TREND ANALYSIS 
Figure 15 plots how the participants’ effort levels varied over the course of 
the experiment.  (Only odd period choices are shown in these pictures, because 
under the horizontal incentive system, even periods are enforcement periods.)  
The level of effort represents the average number of participants on each team 
who chose high resources in the given period (ranging from 0 to 2).  The 
Friedman test (the non-parametric equivalent of a one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA) is used to compare effort levels across periods in each of the four 
experimental conditions.  The results of this test (presented in Table 10) indicate 
that in all four experimental conditions, there is no significant period effect.35  
However, this lack of statistical evidence is likely attributable to limited statistical 
power, as casual observation of Figure 15 seems to indicate a downward slope in 
all four conditions.  This casual observation is corroborated by statistical evidence 
when the four conditions are collapsed.  The Friedman test comparing effort 
levels across periods in this collapsed data set detects a significant difference in 
effort across periods (χ2 = 24.52, p < 0.01).  Further, when the Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks test is used to compare Period 1 effort to Period 19 effort, Period 1 effort is 
significantly higher (or at least marginally so) than Period 19 effort in all four 
experimental conditions (see Table 11).  The one-tailed p-values for the four 
                                                 
35 The χ2 statistic in the Friedman test is analogous to the F-statistic in a one-way ANOVA.  A 
significant statistic would indicate some difference in effort levels across periods. 
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conditions range from 0.04 to 0.10.  Thus, statistical evidence provides evidence 
of a downward trend in effort levels over the course of the experiment. 
This downward trend is notable, because it is difficult to rationalize an 
explanation that would account for consistent decreases in effort over time across 
all conditions.  Specifically, most underlying explanations for changes in behavior 
over time would logically have opposite effects under the two incentive systems.  
Take learning, for example.  If participants are learning the strategies that lead to 
greater payoffs, one would expect increased cooperation over time, leading to 
higher effort under the horizontal incentive system and lower effort under the 
vertical incentive system.  The downward sloping lines under the horizontal 
system are thus inconsistent with a learning explanation.  One might alternately 
conjecture that the decrease in effort is due to a breakdown in cooperation.  
However, the results under the vertical system are inconsistent with this 
explanation, as a breakdown in cooperation would lead to less collusion and 
higher effort levels under this system.   
It seems that different factors may be affecting behavior over time under 
the two systems.  For example, in the relatively complex vertical incentive 
system, learning may play a larger role, leading to increased cooperation and 
decreased effort over time.  (This explanation is consistent with post-experimental 
survey evidence that participants perceived the vertical system to be more 
complex than the horizontal system.)  The current design cannot disentangle the 
different factors affecting behavior over time.  However, the results provide 
evidence of complex relationships between the incentive systems and behavioral 
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factors.  These complex relationships may be the subject of future research, 
following the approach of the current study in examining interactions between 
economic and psychological variables. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A – Primary Variables 
Low High Low High
Mean (Std. Dev.)
Total Effort 10.31 15.88 11.38 7.13
  (# of times "high"  picked) (5.51) (5.02) (6.78) (7.92) 
Communication 18.19 68.94 13.88 51.19
  (# of words) (52.40) (99.28) (38.06) (74.87)
Points Earned 352.25 384.75 465.63 613.13
(34.21) (24.70) (184.53) (159.90)
Ending Level of Team Identity 5.56 6.06 4.41 6.00






















Low High Low High
Mean (Std. Dev.)
Beginning Level of Team Identity 4.34 5.44 4.59 5.03
  (Manipulation Check) (1.65) (0.96) (1.31) (0.94)
Desire for Future Interaction 5.22 5.97 5.75 5.81
(1.37) (1.42) (1.34) (1.34)
Concern for Outcomes 4.72 4.88 4.75 4.63
(1=Individual to 7=Team) (0.86) (1.43) (1.28) (1.10)
Production Interdependence 5.78 5.40 6.00 5.38
(1.35) (1.26) (0.82) (1.36)
Complexity of Incentive System 3.38 2.94 3.56 3.53
(1.48) (1.24) (0.83) (0.79)
Factors Considered:
   Cooperate 5.75 6.06 6.00 5.94
(0.63) (0.79) (1.10) (0.85)
   Do the right thing for your division 4.97 7.72 5.13 4.75
(0.99) (12.72) (1.00) (1.43)
   Do the right thing for other division 4.06 4.22 4.47 4.25
(1.05) (1.45) (1.20) (1.76)
   Do the right thing for firm 5.38 4.69 4.81 4.82
(0.65) (1.41) (1.40) (1.50)
   Be honest 5.16 5.16 4.84 4.63





Table 3 – Tests for Normality 
p-value
Experimental Condition K-S Z (two-tailed)
Horizontal, Low Identity
  Total Effort 0.62 0.84
  Communication 2.04 < 0.01
  Ending Team Identity 0.59 0.87
Horizontal, High Identity
  Total Effort 0.84 0.50
  Communication 1.03 0.24
  Ending Team Identity 1.23 0.11
Vertical, Low Identity
  Total Effort 0.64 0.81
  Communication 2.07 < 0.01
  Ending Team Identity 0.73 0.67
Vertical, High Identity
  Total Effort 1.03 0.24
  Communication 1.34 0.06





Table 4 – ANOVA for Hypothesis 1 
The Effect of Team Identity and Incentives on Effort 






















Team Identity 1 6.89 0.17 0.68
Incentive System 1 236.39 5.76 0.02
Incentive System X Team Identity 1 385.14 9.38 < 0.01
Error 60 41.08
Panel B:  Simple Effects for Each Incentive System
1 144.50 3.52 0.07
1 247.53 6.03 0.02
Effect of Team Identity under
Vertical Incentive System
Effect of Team Identity under
Horizontal  Incentive System
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Table 5 – Alternate Analysis of Hypothesis 1 
The Effect of Team Identity and Incentives on Effort 







Intercept 0.071 0.185 0.83 0.41
Incentive System 0.176 0.185 2.07 0.04
Team Identity -0.009 0.185 -0.11 0.92
Incentive System X Team Identity 0.225 0.185 2.64 <.01
I  = Incentive System (Vertical coded as -1, Horizontal coded as +1)
T = Team Identity (Low coded as -1, High coded as +1)





 Table 6 – ANOVA for Hypothesis 3 







Incentive System 1 5.94 2.11 0.15
Team Identity (Manipulated) 1 17.54 6.23 0.02




Table 7 – Alternate ANOVA for Hypothesis 3 
The Effect of the Incentive System on the Change Team Identity 







Incentive System 1 4.52 1.21 0.28
Team Identity (Manipulated) 1 1.27 0.34 0.56
Incentive System X Team Identity 1 12.25 3.27 0.07
Error 60 3.75
Panel B:  Simple Ef f ects f or Each Level of  Identity
1 15.82 4.22 0.04
1 3.00 0.80 0.37
Effect of the Incentive System in the 
Low Identity  Condition
Effect of the Incentive System in the 
High Identity  Condition
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Table 8 – Contingent Decision Making Under the Vertical System 
High Identity
Ef f ort Choice
Low High Total
Low 13% 54% 67%
High 0% 33% 33%
13% 87% 100%
Low Identity
Ef f ort Choice 
Low High Total
Low 14% 29% 43%










Low 2% 18% 20%





Low 13% 36% 49%















Table 10 – Trend Analysis Using the Friedman Test 
An Omnibus Test of Differences in Effort Across All Periods 
 
p-value
Experimental Condition χ 2 (two-tailed)
Horizontal, Low Identity 8.63 0.47
Horizontal, High Identity 5.23 0.81
Vertical, Low Identity 10.46 0.31
Vertical, High Identity 12.26 0.20









Table 11 – Trend Analysis Using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
A Test Comparing Efforts in Period 1 and Period 19 
p-value
Experimental Condition Ζ (two-tailed)
Horizontal, Low Identity -1.26 0.21
Horizontal, High Identity -1.41 0.16
Vertical, Low Identity -1.51 0.13
Vertical, High Identity -1.79 0.07













































Figure 11 – Hypothesis 2 Results 
 
 
Overall Goodness of Fit:  χ 2  = 0.15, p = 0.70 
  (tests the null that the model is a good fit). 
** Significant at < .01 
*   Significant at < .05 
      Team Identity 
Communication Effort 
+ 0.46 (Horizontal)** 
- 0.19 (Vertical) 
+0.26 (Horizontal)** 
+0.34 (Vertical)** 
+ 0.07 (Horizontal) 


































































Low Identity High Identity
     Teammate’s 
Reporting Choice 
 
Note that the height of the bars represents a team member’s resource choice in a 
given period, whereas the shading of the bars represents his/her teammate’s 
reporting choice in the same period. 
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Low High Low High

















Note that the height of the bars represents a team member’s choice in an odd 
period, whereas the shading of the bars represents his/her teammate’s choice in 
the immediately following even period. 
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Figure 15 – Trend Analysis 


















































Chapter 8:  Summary and Conclusions 
This study presents evidence that the effectiveness of a financial incentive 
system can be either enhanced or degraded by a strong sense of identity, 
depending on specific characteristics of the incentive system.  A vertical incentive 
system, in which the agents report observations of their teammates’ efforts to the 
principal, becomes less effective in the presence of a strong team identity.  Under 
this incentive system, a strong team identity leads individuals to collude against 
the principal, choosing low levels of effort and reporting falsely.  Conversely, the 
effectiveness of a horizontal incentive system, based on peer-enacted control, is 
enhanced by a strong team identity.  Because no collusive opportunities exist 
under this incentive system, a strong team identity serves to help teams to reach 
cooperative solutions, as desired by the principal.  The evidence presented here 
suggests that under both incentive systems, the effect of team identity on 
cooperation has both direct (based on a change of cognitive focus) and indirect 
(communication-mediated) components.  
Finally, evidence suggests that team identity is partially endogenous, in 
that it is affected by the incentive system in place.  After repeated interaction, the 
horizontal system, with its focus on team outcomes rather than individual 
contributions, leads to higher levels of team identity than does the vertical 
incentive system, where individuals act as whistle blowers for the principal. 
This research provides useful insights for both theory and practice.  From 
a practical standpoint, this study provides evidence on the usefulness of mutual 
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monitoring as an alternative to traditional methods of measuring individual 
production inputs.  In many joint production settings, workers hold high-quality 
information on co-workers’ inputs, and firms can benefit by understanding how to 
use this knowledge base to make informed decisions in such areas as resource 
allocation, compensation, and promotion.  I demonstrate that when the team has 
achieved a high level of identity, the best way to use this information may not be 
to extract it through reporting mechanisms.  Instead, the most effective incentive 
system may be horizontal in nature, delegating responsibility for control to self-
managed teams.  This study thus helps explain why firms have more readily 
embraced horizontal incentive systems than vertical incentive systems. 
Further, this study provides evidence on the types of incentive systems 
that are most likely to be effective for different types of teams.  For example, 
Scott (1997) demonstrates that permanent teams tend to develop higher levels of 
identity than do part-time or temporary teams.  One inference from the results 
presented here is that the horizontal approach is particularly appropriate for work 
teams involved in manufacturing or other permanent production-related tasks.  
Thus, by focusing on the consequences of team identification, this study aids in 
understanding the causal linkages among team characteristics, incentives, and 
performance. 
From a theoretical standpoint, this study examines the intersection 
between economics and psychology, demonstrating that concepts from 
psychology may be useful in understanding the economic incentives addressed by 
agency theory.  The study therefore adds to an expanding body of literature 
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examining variables that interact with financial incentives to influence 
performance (Bonner et al. 2000, Bonner and Sprinkle 2001, Drake et al. 1999, 
Sprinkle 2000).  The paper contributes more specifically to the relatively 
undeveloped literature on the effect of incentives in a team environment (Drake et 
al. 1999, Fisher et al. 2001, Rankin 2001, Rankin and Sayre 2000). 
Certain factors limit the generalizability of these results.  For example, one 
may view these results as implying that firms should always use the horizontal 
system, because it performs better than the vertical incentive system when the 
team identity is high and no worse when the team identity is low.  However, this 
study was not designed to directly compare these two systems, and any such 
comparisons should be interpreted with caution, because of my treatment of risk 
preferences.  To simplify the laboratory experiment, the stochastic element was 
removed, and the incentive systems were presented to participants in expected 
value terms.  Such an abstraction is appropriate, because risk preferences are not 
relevant to the hypotheses investigated in this study.  However, risk preferences 
are an outside factor that can affect the desirability of a vertical incentive system 
over a horizontal one.  The vertical incentive system provides a first-best solution, 
meaning that the agents take on no output-based risk under this system.  In 
contrast, the horizontal incentive system requires the agents to take on risk, for 
which they must be compensated.  Thus, if risk preferences were considered, the 
cost of achieving the high levels of effort under the horizontal incentive system 
could be greater than the costs of achieving lower levels of effort under the 
vertical system.  There are tradeoffs involved, and this paper cannot evaluate the 
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absolute effectiveness of either system.  The current findings show only that team 
identity enhances the effectiveness of the horizontal system, while degrading the 
effectiveness of the vertical system. 
I also make the simplifying assumption that effort is discrete and perfectly 
observable, an attribute almost certainly not characteristic of real-world settings.  
While team members may observe the amount of time a coworker spends on a 
particular task, it is considerably more difficult to observe the intensity or 
creativity with which s/he works.36  This study compares two analytic approaches 
to incentive contracting, and these simplifying assumptions help to enhance 
comparability of results across the two incentive systems.  However, it is unclear 
how the results would change if effort were imperfectly observable.  For example, 
in their experimental investigation of several budget-based group incentive plans, 
Fisher et al. (2001) demonstrate different effects on effort duration, which is 
easily observed, and effort intensity, which is less easily observed.  This 
limitation offers an opportunity for future research, and a body of psychology 
literature may prove helpful.  Social Comparison Theory (Kunda 1999, 494) 
provides a rich theory for understanding the more subtle aspects of mutual 
monitoring.  Thus, future work in this area may follow the approach used here of 
melding insights from both economics and psychology to understand complex 
managerial accounting issues.  
                                                 
36 These dimensions of effort are not only unobservable, but are also likely immeasurable.  This 
leads to difficulty in meeting another assumption – common knowledge of the probability 
distribution of outcomes given effort. 
 109 
Appendix A – Experimental Materials 
High Identity, Vertical Incentive System 
 
You were each assigned to a color group when you arrived.  Each of you will be 
paired with a member of your color group (who will be referred to as your 
teammate).  
 
Assume that you and your teammate are two division managers working for 
Company XYZ.   The company produces one product, but both of your divisions 
participate in the production of that product.  You will be asked to make decisions 
for a number of periods, and your compensation will be based on the decisions 
made by both you and your teammate.  You will accumulate points from your 
decisions.    At the end of the session, your accumulated point balance from all 
periods will be paid to you in real cash at a rate of $1.00 per 10 points.  (For 
example, if your balance was 100 at the end of the session, you would receive 




Your services for Company XYZ require you to provide resources, which you can 
think of as work effort.  Because effort is costly, providing high resources is more 
costly to you individually than providing low resources.  You must choose 
between two alternatives, with the following consequences:   
• High Resources – If you choose to provide high resources to the firm in 
any given period, your division’s productivity will be high but you will 
incur a personal cost of 10 points. 
• Low Resources – If you choose to provide low resources to the firm in any 
given period, your division’s productivity will be low but you will not 
incur any personal cost. 
 
Your teammate will be asked to make the same decision for his/her division.  
After independently making the decisions, you will be informed of the decision 
your teammate made. 
 
Reporting 
You will be required to submit a report every period, in which you will document 
the level of resources your teammate provided in the period.  Note that while 
you will know with certainty what level of resources your teammate provided, 
you are not required to report that level.  You can choose to report either high or 
low, regardless of what your teammate actually did. 
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Compensation  
Your compensation will be based on the report filed by your teammate.  
Specifically,  
• If your teammate reports that you provided high resources, you will 
receive 20 points. 
• If your teammate reports that you provided low resources, you will receive 
0 points. 
 
The same compensation applies also to your teammate, who will be compensated 
based on the report you file.  That is,  
• If you report that your teammate provided high resources, your teammate 
will receive 20 points. 
• If you report that your teammate provided low resources, your teammate 
will receive 0 points. 
 
Reporting Bonuses and Penalties 
You will also earn an extra bonus if you report that your teammate provided low 
resources, but only if s/he actually did provide low resources.  Specifically, 
• If you report that your teammate provided low resources, this will be 
verified, and if your teammate actually did provide low resources, you will 
receive a bonus of 10 points. 
• However, if you report that your teammate provided low resources, and 
your teammate actually provided high resources, you will incur a penalty 
of 20 points.  
 
The same reporting bonus and penalty applies also to your teammate with respect 
to your decision.  That is,   
• If your teammate reports that you provided low resources, and you 
actually did provide low resources, your teammate will receive a bonus of 
10 points. 
• However, if your teammate reports that you provided low resources, and 
you actually provided high resources, your teammate will incur a penalty 





For each period, you will fill out the following table to keep track of your 




Circle the level of resources that you will provide.
        HIGH
        LOW
If you choose to provide high resources, deduct 10
points.





The administrator will circle the level of resources that
your teammate provided.
        HIGH
        LOW
Filing your
Report
What report would you like to make regarding the
level of resources your teammate provided?
       HIGH
       LOW
Compensation If your teammate reported that you provided high
resources, add 20 points.





If you reported that your teammate provided high
resources, enter -0-.
If you reported that your teammate provided low
resources, the administrator will verify if your
teammate did in fact provide low resources, as you
reported.
      YES (enter a bonus of 10 points)
     NO (enter a penalty of 20 points)
Total
Add / subtract the entries in each cell and write your
total compensation for this period here.  Remember
that your compensation in dollars for this period is this
point total divided by 10.
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Low Identity, Vertical Incentive System 
 
You were each assigned to a color group when you arrived.  Each of you will be 
paired with a member of the other color group (who will be referred to as the 
other participant).  
 
Assume that you and the other participant are two division managers working for 
Company XYZ.   The company produces one product, but both of your divisions 
participate in the production of that product.  You will be asked to make decisions 
for a number of periods, and your compensation will be based on the decisions 
made by both you and the other participant.  You will accumulate points from 
your decisions.    At the end of the session, your accumulated point balance from 
all periods will be paid to you in real cash at a rate of $1.00 per 10 points.  (For 
example, if your balance was 100 at the end of the session, you would receive 





Your services for Company XYZ require you to provide resources, which you can 
think of as work effort.  Because effort is costly, providing high resources is more 
costly to you individually than providing low resources.  You must choose 
between two alternatives, with the following consequences:   
• High Resources – If you choose to provide high resources to the firm in 
any given period, your division’s productivity will be high but you will 
incur a personal cost of 10 points. 
• Low Resources – If you choose to provide low resources to the firm in any 
given period, your division’s productivity will be low but you will not 
incur any personal cost. 
 
The other participant will be asked to make the same decision for his/her division.  
After independently making the decisions, you will be informed of the decision 
the other participant made. 
 
Reporting 
You will be required to submit a report every period, in which you will document 
the level of resources the other participant provided in the period.  Note that 
while you will know with certainty what level of resources the other participant 
provided, you are not required to report that level.  You can choose to report 




Your compensation will be based on the report filed by the other participant.  
Specifically,  
• If the other participant reports that you provided high resources, you will 
receive 20 points. 
• If the other participant reports that you provided low resources, you will 
receive 0 points. 
 
The same compensation applies also to the other participant, who will be 
compensated based on the report you file.  That is,  
• If you report that the other participant provided high resources, the other 
participant will receive 20 points. 
• If you report that the other participant provided low resources, the other 
participant will receive 0 points. 
 
Reporting Bonuses and Penalties 
You will also earn an extra bonus if you report that the other participant provided 
low resources, but only if s/he actually did provide low resources.  Specifically,  
• If you report that the other participant provided low resources, this will be 
verified, and if the other participant actually did provide low resources, 
you will receive a bonus of 10 points. 
• However, if you report that the other participant provided low resources, 
and the other participant actually provided high resources, you will incur a 
penalty of 20 points.  
 
The same reporting bonus and penalty applies also to the other participant with 
respect to your decision.  That is,   
• If the other participant reports that you provided low resources, and you 
actually did provide low resources, the other participant will receive a 
bonus of 10 points. 
• However, if the other participant reports that you provided low resources, 
and you actually provided high resources, the other participant will incur a 




For each period, you will fill out the following table to keep track of your 




Circle the level of resources that you will provide.
        HIGH
        LOW
If you choose to provide high resources, deduct 10
points.





The administrator will circle the level of resources that
the other participant provided.
        HIGH
        LOW
Filing your
Report
What report would you like to make regarding the
level of resources the other participant provided?
       HIGH
       LOW
Compensation If the other participant reported that you provided
high resources, add 20 points.





If you reported that the other participant provided high
resources, enter -0-.
If you reported that the other participant provided low
resources, the administrator will verify if the other
participant did in fact provide low resources, as you
reported.
      YES (enter a bonus of 10 points)
     NO (enter a penalty of 20 points)
Total Add / subtract the entries in each cell and write your
total compensation for this period here.  Remember
that your compensation in dollars for this period is this
point total divided by 10.
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High Identity, Horizontal Incentive System 
 
You were assigned to a color group when you arrived.  Each of you will be paired 
with a member of your color group (who will be referred to as your teammate).   
 
Assume that you and your teammate are two division managers working for 
Company XYZ.   The company produces one product, but both of your divisions 
participate in the production of that product.  You will be asked to make decisions 
for a number of periods, and your compensation will be based on the decisions 
made by both you and your teammate.  You will accumulate points from your 
decisions.    At the end of the session, your accumulated point balance from all 
periods will be paid to you in real cash at a rate of $1.00 per 10 points.  (For 
example, if your balance was 100 at the end of the session, you would receive 




Your services for Company XYZ require you to provide resources, which you can 
think of as work effort.  Because effort is costly, providing high resources is more 
costly to you individually than providing low resources.  You must choose 
between two alternatives, with the following consequences:   
• High Resources – If you choose to provide high resources to the firm in any 
given period, your division’s productivity will be high but you will incur a 
personal cost of 10 points. 
• Low Resources – If you choose to provide low resources to the firm in any 
given period, your division’s productivity will be low but you will not incur 
any personal cost. 
 
Your teammate will be asked to make the same decision for his/her division.  
After independently making the decisions, you will be informed of the decision 
your teammate made. 
 
Compensation  
You and your teammate will receive the same compensation, and it will depend 
on the level of resources you both provide.  Recall that you will be making 
decisions for a number of periods.  The compensation plan will be different in 
even numbered and odd numbered periods. 
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Periods 1, 3, 5 . . .  
• If both you and your teammate provide high resources, you will each receive 
20 points. 
• If either you or your teammate (but not both of you) provides high resources, 
you will each receive 14 points. 
• If neither you nor your teammate provides high resources, you will each 
receive 8 points. 
 
Periods 2, 4, 6 . . .  
• If both you and your teammate provide high resources, you will each receive 
20 points. 
• If either you or your teammate (but not both of you) provides high resources, 
you will each receive 10 points. 
• If neither you nor your teammate provides high resources, you will each 
receive no points. 
 
 
Note that a key difference between the compensation in odd and even-numbered 
periods is that in odd-numbered periods, your net number of points 
(Compensation minus Resource Costs) will be determined by both your decision 
and the other participant’s decision.  However, in the even-numbered periods, 
your net points will be determined entirely by the other participant’s decision.  
This is because in even periods, if the other participant provides high resources, 
you will earn a net of 10 points irrespective of whether you provide high 
resources (because 20 points compensation – 10 points cost = 10) or low 
resources (because 10 points compensation – 0 points cost = 10).  Similarly, if 
the other participant provides low resources, you will earn a net of 0 points 
irrespective of whether you provide high resources (because 10 points 
compensation – 10 points cost = 0) or low resources (because 0 points 
compensation – 0 points cost = 0).  Thus, in even periods, your decision only 
affects the other person’s payoffs, not your payoffs. 
 
Note also that while the compensation will change every other period, you will be 
paired with the same person throughout the exercise.  Therefore, it may be 
appropriate to think about the other participant’s decisions in prior periods when 






For each period, you will fill out the following table to keep track of your 
decisions and compensation. 
Providing
Resources
Circle the level of resources that you will provide.
        HIGH
        LOW
If you choose to provide high resources, deduct 10
points.





The administrator will circle the level of resources that
your teammate provided.
        HIGH
        LOW
Compensation Periods 1, 3, 5 . . .
• If both you and your teammate provided high
resources, add 20 points.
• 4If either you or your teammate (but not both)
provided high resources, add 14 points.
• If neither you nor your teammate provided high
resources, add 8 points.
Periods 2, 4, 6 . . .
• If both you and your teammate provided high
resources, add 20 points.
• If either you or your teammate (but not both)
provided high resources, add 10 points.
• If neither you nor your teammate provided high
resources, enter -0-.
Total Add / subtract the entries in each cell and write your
total compensation for this period here.  Remember
that your compensation in dollars for this period is this
point total divided by 10.
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Low Identity, Horizontal Incentive System 
 
You were assigned to a color group when you arrived.  Each of you will be paired 
with a member of the other color group (who will be referred to as the other 
participant).  
 
Assume that you and the other participant are two division managers working for 
Company XYZ.   The company produces one product, but both of your divisions 
participate in the production of that product.  You will be asked to make decisions 
for a number of periods, and your compensation will be based on the decisions 
made by both you and the other participant.  You will accumulate points from 
your decisions.    At the end of the session, your accumulated point balance from 
all periods will be paid to you in real cash at a rate of $1.00 per 10 points.  (For 
example, if your balance was 100 at the end of the session, you would receive 




Your services for Company XYZ require you to provide resources, which you can 
think of as work effort.  Because effort is costly, providing high resources is more 
costly to you individually than providing low resources.  You must choose 
between two alternatives, with the following consequences:   
• High Resources – If you choose to provide high resources to the firm in 
any given period, your division’s productivity will be high but you will 
incur a personal cost of 10 points. 
• Low Resources – If you choose to provide low resources to the firm in any 
given period, your division’s productivity will be low but you will not 
incur any personal cost. 
 
The other participant will be asked to make the same decision for his/her division.  
After independently making the decisions, you will be informed of the decision 
the other participant made. 
 
Compensation  
You and the other participant will receive the same compensation, and it will 
depend on the level of resources you both provide.  Recall that you will be 
making decisions for a number of periods.  The compensation plan will be 
different in even numbered and odd numbered periods. 
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Periods 1, 3, 5 . . .  
• If both you and the other participant provide high resources, you will each 
receive 20 points. 
• If either you or the other participant (but not both of you) provides high 
resources, you will each receive 14 points. 
• If neither you nor the other participant provides high resources, you will 
each receive 8 points. 
 
Periods 2, 4, 6 . . .  
• If both you and the other participant provide high resources, you will each 
receive 20 points. 
• If either you or the other participant (but not both of you) provides high 
resources, you will each receive 10 points. 
• If neither you nor the other participant provides high resources, you will 
each receive no points. 
 
Note that a key difference between the compensation in odd and even-numbered 
periods is that in odd-numbered periods, your net number of points 
(Compensation minus Resource Costs) will be determined by both your decision 
and the other participant’s decision.  However, in the even-numbered periods, 
your net points will be determined entirely by the other participant’s decision.  
This is because in even periods, if the other participant provides high resources, 
you will earn a net of 10 points irrespective of whether you provide high 
resources (because 20 points compensation – 10 points cost = 10) or low 
resources (because 10 points compensation – 0 points cost = 10).  Similarly, if 
the other participant provides low resources, you will earn a net of 0 points 
irrespective of whether you provide high resources (because 10 points 
compensation – 10 points cost = 0) or low resources (because 0 points 
compensation – 0 points cost = 0).  Thus, in even periods, your decision only 
affects the other person’s payoffs, not your payoffs. 
 
Note also that while the compensation will change every other period, you will be 
paired with the same person throughout the exercise.  Therefore, it may be 
appropriate to think about the other participant’s decisions in prior periods when 






For each period, you will fill out the following table to keep track of your 




Circle the level of resources that you will provide.
        HIGH
        LOW
If you choose to provide high resources, deduct 10
points.





The administrator will circle the level of resources that
the other participant provided.
        HIGH
        LOW
Compensation Periods 1, 3, 5 . . .
• If both you and the other participant provided high
resources, add 20 points.
• If either you or the other participant (but not both)
provided high resources, add 14 points.
• If neither you nor the other participant provided
high resources, add 8 points.
Periods 2, 4, 6 . . .
• If both you and the other participant provided high
resources, add 20 points.
• If either you or the other participant (but not both)
provided high resources, add 10 points.
• If neither you nor the other participant provided
high resources, enter -0-.
Total Add / subtract the entries in each cell and write your
total compensation for this period here.  Remember
that your compensation in dollars for this period is this
point total divided by 10.
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What is this? 
This is a business decision making 
experiment in which each of you will 
act as a business manager of XYZ 
company, making a series of 
decisions. 
Ground Rules 
• No Talking. 
• No Deception. 
• No right or wrong answers. 
Agenda 
• Read a case study describing the 
decisions you will be asked to make. 
















































Documentation for Each Period 
• Fill out a pink resource decision form. 
• Enter your resource decision on the record- 
keeping form. 
• The administrator will then show you the 
resource decision record completed by 
your teammate and record this information 
on the record-keeping form. 
• Fill out a green   report form. 
• The administrator will then show you the 
report record completed by your teammate 
and record this information on the record- 
keeping form. 
• Calculate your total points for the period 
on the record-keeping form. 














































Documentation for Each Period
• Fill out a pink resource decision form.
• Enter your resource decision on the record-
keeping form.
• The administrator will then show you the
resource decision record completed by the
other participant and record this
information on the record-keeping form.
• Fill out a green report form.
• The administrator will then show you the
report record completed by the other
participant and record this information on
the record-keeping form.
• Calculate your total points for the period
on the record-keeping form.
• Write your total points on the gold point
tally form.
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Documentation for Each Period 
• Fill out a pink resource decision form. 
• Enter your resource decision on the record- 
keeping form. 
• The administrator will then show you the 
resource decision record completed by 
your teammate and record this information 
on the record-keeping form. 
• Calculate your total points for the period 
on the record-keeping form. 















































Documentation for Each Period
• Fill out a pink resource decision form.
• Enter your resource decision on the record-
keeping form.
• The administrator will then show you the
resource decision record completed by the
other participant and record this
information on the record-keeping form.
• Calculate your total points for the period
on the record-keeping form.















Appendix C – Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
Please take a few minutes to answer a few brief questions.  This will help us to 
interpret the results. 
 
1. What program are you in?   (Circle one)    MBA       MPA        PPA      
Other ________________ 
 
2. How many years of full-time work experience (internships or post-
undergraduate) do you have?   ________________ 
 
3. If you have full-time work experience, what type of work did you 
do?________________ 
 
For the following questions, please circle the numbers that correspond to 
your answer. 
 
4. At the beginning of the session, to what extent did you perceive yourself to be 
a teammate of the person you were paired with? 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
       Definitely              Maybe a                    Definitely  
   Not a teammate            teammate                  a teammate   
 
            
5. At the end of the session, to what extent did you perceive yourself to be a 
teammate of the person you were paired with? 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
        Definitely              Maybe a                    Definitely  
   Not a teammate            teammate                  a teammate   
 
 
6. If you were to participate in a similar study in the future, to what extent would 
you like to be paired with the same person again? 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
      Definitely              Indifferent                    Definitely 
   would Not like          to being paired                  would like 
 to be paired with           with the same             to be paired with 
 the same person                      person               the same person 
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7. When you were considering your choices, were you more concerned with 
maximizing your own profit or maximizing the total profit to you and the 
person you were paired with? 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
    Only interested  Interested in both               Only interested 
   in my own profit               my own profit and            in the total profit 
     the total profit 
 
8. To what extent did you feel that your division’s productivity was influenced 
by the effort of the person you were paired with? 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
   Not at all              Moderately       Heavily 
 Influenced              Influenced                              Influenced 
         
9. How complex did you find the compensation method? 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
           Very        Moderately                       Very 
          Simple         Complex      Complex 
 
10. To what extent did the following factors influence your decisions? 
 
a)  A desire to cooperate. 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
   Not at all             Moderately                 To a great 
                                                     Extent 
 
b)  A desire to do the right thing for your division. 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
        Not at all            Moderately                  To a great 
                                    Extent 
 
c)  A desire to do the right thing for the other division. 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
        Not at all            Moderately                   To a great 
                                     Extent 
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d)  A desire to do the right thing for the firm. 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
         Not at all               Moderately      To a great 
                                       Extent 
 
e)  A desire to be honest 
 
1       2              3                 4                    5                   6          7 
 
         Not at all               Moderately      To a great 
                                       Extent 
 
 
































Thank you very much for participating!  Please do not discuss the study with 
others who may be participating until after September 21, 2001. 
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Appendix D – Communication Transcript Samples 




Blue 3:  How are we gonna do this?  Take turns maximizing?  Comprende?  I’m 
not sure how this is gonna work out.  I’m trying to figure out how we’ll 




Blue 3:  Let’s try this. . . say I did “high.”  We’ll see how it works.Let me know 
what you think.  I’m figuring the best way is just to take turns getting 30. 
 




Blue 3:  It’s the best thing I can think of. 
 
Blue 4:  Yeah, me too 
 




Blue 1:  If you provide low and I say you provided high every time (and vice 
versa), I think we’ll both make the most money. 
 
Yellow 1:   One of us should choose to be low and the other high every time.  
Then both report high.  You get 30 points each time.  (I think!) I’ll be high 









Blue 1:  If we both report low, we can both say the other one of us reported high.  
Then we’d both get 20 points and neither one of us would lose 10 points.  
We’d both get 20 every time. 
 








Blue 1: I don’t know.  I guess just keep doing the same thing, but think about it. 
 








Blue 1:  Might as well stay with the same thing.  I’ll keep thinking.  
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